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1
LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE UNDERUSE OF TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS
Karie Davis-Nozemack* and Sarah J. Webber†

ABSTRACT
Legal literature on whistleblower programs often assumes an agency’s ability to
effectively use a whistleblower tip. This article challenges that assumption in the
context of tax enforcement by exposing the Internal Revenue Service’s dismal
performance. The article uses Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, taxpayer privacy law, as
well as whistleblower and tax enforcement literature to propose a new approach to using
information from tax whistleblowers.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) received more than 9,000 tips
from whistleblowers.3 The Service’s current backlog of whistleblower tips is more than
22,000.4 In the last five years under the formalized IRS Whistleblower Program, the
program has made approximately 100 awards per year.5 With so much information
pouring into the Service, why has the Service capitalized on so few tips? This paper
argues that answer lies in the Service’s approach to whistleblowers and the administrative
burdens that weigh down the program. Together these issues produce an environment
where a whistleblower tip is often not a short cut to successful enforcement but a
meandering path to nowhere.
A close analysis of the program shows the program’s deficiencies to be internal to the
agency. The primary deficiency is the underutilization of whistleblowers. Simply put,
the Service does not seek all available information and assistance from whistleblowers.
The Service’s policies for interviewing whistleblowers, often referred to as debriefing,
are a lens with which to view the underutilization. In the past six years, the Service has
taken a variety of approaches to interviewing whistleblowers. Initially, the Service had
no formal policy on meeting with whistleblowers, then adopted a policy of meeting with
whistleblowers only a single time, 6 and then moved to a policy of meeting with
whistleblowers only on a case-by-case basis.7 Most recently, in August 2014, the Service
adopted a policy of debriefing some whistleblowers.8 None of these policies have
allowed the Service to efficiently leverage the tips and nimbly integrate whistleblower
information into the enforcement process.
The ineffective prior policies are a result of (1) overreaction to mild legal obstacles,
(2) Service culture that is resistant to incorporating whistleblower information, and (3) an
overly burdensome administrative process for utilizing whistleblower tips. In 2012 and
2014, Service executives published memos encouraging the debriefing of
whistleblowers.9 While these pronouncements were steps in the right direction, the
policy pronouncements were largely aspirational, fail to provide appropriate procedures
for debriefing, and consequently leave Service personnel with insufficient guidance.
Legal literature on whistleblower programs often assumes an agency’s ability to
3

See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
SECTION 7623, at tbl 1 (9,268 total claims received for Fiscal Year 2013).
4
See id. at tbl 1 (22,330 Claims Open ending Fiscal Year 2013).
5
See id. at tbl 6 (110 awards paid in FY 2009, 97 awards paid in FY 2010, 97 awards paid in FY 2011,
128 awards paid in FY 2012, and 122 awards paid in FY 2013).
6
See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2008-011, Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current
Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 27, 2008) at 1-2.
7
See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2010-004, Clarification of CC Notice 2008-011 - Limitations
on Informant Contacts: Current Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 17, 2010) at 2.
8
See Memo from John Dalrymple, Deputy Commissioner for Enforcement to Commissioner, Large
Business and International et al, at 1-2 (Aug. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Dalrymple Memo].
9
See Memo from Steven Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Enforcement to Commissioner, Large
Business and International et al, at 2 (Jun. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/field_directive_dated_june_20_2012.pdf [hereinafter Miller Memo].
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effectively utilize a whistleblower tip. This article challenges that assumption and uses
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, taxpayer privacy law, as well as whistleblower and tax
enforcement literature to suggest policy improvements. This article uses a critical eye to
examine legal constraints for debriefing tax whistleblowers and, in light of the findings,
proposes a new approach. In Part I, the article makes the case for the importance of
whistleblowers, particularly for tax enforcement. Given the assistance that tax
whistleblowers could bring to the Service’s enforcement mission, Part II of the article
then discusses the evolution of Service’s policies for receiving information from
whistleblowers. These prior policies appear to be an overreaction to the mild legal
obstacles, which are discussed in Part III. Finally, Part IV presents new approaches to
debriefing. In particular, Part IV suggests expanding the parameters of debriefing beyond
its current confined usage. It also explains that debriefing is useful beyond the gathering
substantive information and could introduce efficiencies in whistleblower tip processing.
I. WHY USE TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS?
The Service is under pressure to raise more revenue and administer new tax credits
with fewer resources. Given this pressure, the Service cannot waste any available
resources. The following Part makes the case for the Service’s general need for
enforcement assistance and specific need for whistleblower assistance.
A. The Service is Struggling with Tax Compliance
At last official measurement in 2006, the U.S. Treasury failed to receive $385 billion
in taxes annually.10 The current estimate of missing tax revenue has risen to $450
billion.11 While a variety of factors contribute to the shockingly large tax gap,12 the vast
majority of the tax gap is attributable to underreported taxes.13 The income linked to
these unreported taxes never appears on any tax return.
Identifying underreported taxes is the duty of the Service’s enforcement programs
and staff. The Service’s recent enforcement efforts have been increasingly less effective
in collecting missing tax revenues. The Service exhibits a multi-year trend of declining
revenue from its enforcement activities.14 The declining enforcement revenue correlates
10

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS RELEASES NEW TAX GAP ESTIMATES; COMPLIANCE RATES
REMAIN STATISTICALLY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS STUDY, http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-NewTax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study.
11
See Hearing on Review of the President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Funding Request for the Department of
the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service Before Subcomm. on Financial Services and General
Government of S. Comm. on Appropriations 23 (Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter George Senate Testimony]
(statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration)
12
The tax gap is the difference between projected revenue and the amount collected. See generally U.
S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE (2009); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41582, TAX GAP, TAX
ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX COMPLIANCE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2011).
13
See George Senate Testimony, supra note __ (stating the tax gap is primarily based on taxpayers’
underreporting of taxes, comprising $376 billion or approximately 84% of the total tax gap).
14
See Hearing on the State of the IRS, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, at 6 (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Koskinen House Testimony] (statement of John A. Koskinen,
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with a drop in the number of returns audited as well as fewer enforcement staff.15
Due to budget pressure, the Service has recently shrunk its staff by more than 6
percent. 16 The Service’s shrinking staff comes at an inopportune time because the
Service’s budget has not kept pace with its expanding task list.17 For example, the Service
has recently begun collecting information from 77,000 foreign financial institutions under
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA) in an attempt to monitor offshore
assets.18 Additionally, the Service’s mission has expanded far beyond that of revenue
collector to include benefits administrator. 19 The Service is now responsible for
implementing significant portions of the Affordable Care Act.20 Furthermore, the agency
must monitor increasingly sophisticated and international business transactions as
commerce becomes more global in nature.21
The recent budgetary and mission pressures compound the structural disadvantage
Com’r Internal Revenue Service)
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs_2014_testimony_wm20514_final__version_020414.pdf
(“… the total is still down by more than $4.2 billion from four years ago, and we are concerned about the
steady decline since the high point of $59.2 billion in FY 2007. The reason for this decline is primarily due
to a decline in revenue from audits, which dropped nearly $400 million in FY 2013 to $9.83 billion, the
lowest level in a decade. This decline in audit revenue is attributable to a decline in the number of returns
audited. The IRS audited the returns of approximately 1.4 million individuals in FY 2013, down 5 percent
from FY 2012 and the lowest level since 1.39 million audits in FY 2008. The audit coverage rate – the
number of audits divided by the number of tax returns – fell below 1 percent to 0.96 percent in FY 2013,
the lowest level since FY 2006. Audits of high-income individuals – defined as those with $1 million or
more in income – fell 3.7 percent as well last year. The IRS examined approximately 61,000 business
returns in FY 2013, down 13 percent from FY 2012.”).
15
See Koskinen House Testimony, supra note __ (noting there were 1,300 fewer Service employees in
examinations, collections, and investigations in FY 2013, resulting in a 6.4 percent workforce reduction
that coincided with a decrease in the total number of audits performed).
16
See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 34 (2013)
(highlighting continued IRS budget cuts as a one of the greatest risks to long-term tax administration).
17
See Anna Bernasek, At the IRS, Trying to Collect More with Less, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/business/yourtaxes/at-the-irs-trying-to-collect-more-withless.html?_r=0. See also Howard Gleckman, IRS Gets Hammered in the 2014 Budget Agreement, FORBES
(Jan. 14, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/01/14/irs-gets-hammered-in-the-2014-budgetagreement/
18
See Chuck Marr and Joel Friedman, Cuts in IRS Budget Have Compromised Taxpayer Service and
Weakened Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, 8, (Jun. 25, 2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-25-14tax.pdf (noting the increasing responsibilities related to FACTA).
19
See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 3 (2012)
(“In addition, we note that the role of the IRS has expanded recently from one focused on tax collection to
one that also involves distributing benefits to a variety of individuals and businesses.” (citing the FirstTime Homebuyer Credit, American Opportunity Tax Credit, and Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010)). See also Bernasek, supra note __ (“Last year alone, staff positions in enforcement dropped
6.4 percent, to the lowest total in a decade: 19,531.”).
20
See Hearing on ACA – Information Technology Readiness And Data Security Before the Subcomm.
on Energy Policy, Health Care And Entitlements of H. Comm. on Oversight And Government Reform and
Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, And Security Technologies of H. Comm.
On Homeland Security (Jul. 17, 2013) (statement of Alan R. Duncan, Assistant Inspector General for
Audit) http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/congress_07172013.pdf
21
See Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self –Regulation,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).
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with which the Service contends. Enforcement is inherently challenging because of the
perpetual informational asymmetry of tax administration.22 Because the Service has less
information than a taxpayer about a taxpayer’s transactions and the Service nearly always
receives a taxpayer’s information in summary form, the Service must play a game of
informational catch up to police revenue collection.23
The Service has attempted to use technology to both educate taxpayers and identify
fraudulent returns;24 however, current technology is not yet an adequate substitute for
enforcement personnel and information leverage. With the enormous stress on Service
resources, the Service can ill afford to ignore available enforcement tools.25 This is why
whistleblowers are such a critical tool for the Service.
B. From Informant to Whistleblower
An informant has the potential to substitute for enforcement personnel by identifying
wrongdoing and by providing a roadmap for prosecution. Law enforcement personnel on
federal, state and local levels make extensive use of informants to aid in enforcement.26
The use of informants in local law enforcement, illegal narcotics, and terrorism is
virtually ubiquitous.27 In many areas, informant usage has replaced many other law
enforcement techniques.28 Informant usage is common because of structural limits to
investigative methods and limited agency resources. 29 Even those who call for
22

See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce The Tax Gap: When Is Information
Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010) (observing that a key problem within tax
enforcement is asymmetric information whereby the taxpayer has facts regarding his or her transactions
throughout the year and the Service must obtain such information from the taxpayer or from third parties).
23
See e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1220 (requiring total sales as a single line-item on the
return).
24
See Koskinen House Testimony , supra note ___.
25
See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 3 (2012)
(noting the Service is seeing an increase workload with decreasing resources resulting in several negative
outcomes including failure to adequately detect tax noncompliance and an inability to maximize revenue
collection).
26
See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 645, 655 (2004) (“It is undisputed that informant use is on the rise.” (citing Michael A. Simons,
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003)
(“Cooperation has never been more prevalent than it is today.”); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 563-4 (1999) (describing “significant increase in cooperation”))). See also
David R. Luri, Sixth Amendment Implication of Information Participation in Defense Meetings, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 795 (1990) (noting that 39 percent of surveyed attorneys had previously
encountered confidential informants during client representation (citing Genego, The New Adversary, 54
BROOKLYN L. REV. 781, 807 (1988))).
27
See Natapoff, The Institutional and Communal Consequences, supra note __ at 650 (noting the wide
informant usage via anecdotal evidence but limited public data available on informant usage).
28
See Andrew Tasliz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1077 (2011)
(reviewing ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE (2009)).
29
See Michael Rich, War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, Ten Years after 9/11: Article: Brass Rings
and Red-Headed Stepchildren: Protecting Active Criminal Informants, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1433, 1435
(2012) (observing that informants play a critical role as a law enforcement tool, especially informants who
have continued connections to the criminal underworld).
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diminished use of informants generally have not suggested diminished use for whitecollar offenders because these offenders would likely go undetected and unpunished.30
Society has come to accept and appreciate whistleblowing as an important part of
enforcement. 31 The term whistleblower is more frequently used than informant,
particularly involving business and white-collar wrongdoing. 32 Indeed, the Service
previously used the term informant but has since updated its terminology to
whistleblower.33 Society’s etymological change is due to greater acceptance of the act of
whistleblowing, which is associated with diminishing trust in corporations as an
institution.34 For most of last century, trust in corporations and the high value placed on
loyalty and fidelity created societal distaste for whistleblowing.35 The 1960s and 1970s
marked changing attitudes regarding corporations and their conduct. 36 As one
commentator has suggested, “the cultural shift from reverence to distrust of large
corporations led to an attitudinal change toward external whistleblowing.”37 Since then,
academics have conceived of whistleblowing as a control instrument38 and a private
monitoring tool supplementing governmental regulation and civil litigation.
For a potential whistleblower to be an effective private monitoring tool, the
whistleblower must have access to relevant information and sufficient incentive to
disclose that information. 39 Early social science research 40 indicated that higher
30

See Tasliz, supra note __ at 1078.
See Richard Haigh and Peter Bowal, Whistleblowing and the Freedom of Conscience: Towards a
New Legal Analysis, 35 DALHOUSIE L. J. 89, 90 (2012) (discussing the changing perceptions of
whistleblowing).
32
See Peter Jubb, Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation, 21 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 77
(1999) (noting the rise of term). See also Genenva Campbell, Snitch or Savior? How the Modern Cultural
Acceptance of the Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in DoddFrank and the Affordable Care Act, 15.2 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 573-576 (2013). See also Amanda C. Leiter,
Soft Whistleblowing, 48 GA. L. REV. 425, 435 (2014) (comparing Professor Terry Morehead Dworkin’s
definition of whistleblowing with statutory definitions of whistleblowing).
33
The IRS Informants’ Rewards Program was renamed as the IRS Whistleblowers Program following
the 2006 I.R.C. § 7623 amendments. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(3), Overview: Authority and Policy (as amended
Jun. 18, 2010). (“The IRS has generally referred to persons who submit information under section 7623 as
‘informants’ and referred to the program as the ‘Informant Claims Program.’ The IRS has also referred to
such persons as ‘claimants’ in published guidance, and the law now refers to the "Whistleblower Office"
and ‘whistleblower program.’ Accordingly, the terms ‘claimant’ and ‘whistleblower’ will be used in this
IRM except where the term ‘informant’ appears in an office title or published document. However, no legal
significance should be inferred based solely on the use of these terms in this IRM.”).
34
See Campbell, supra note __ at 571-573 (2013) (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, WHISTLE BLOWING!
LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1-4 (1981)).
35
See id.
36
See id (citing WESTIN, supra note __ at 4-6 (1981) and BERNARD RUBIN ET AL, BIG BUSINESS AND
THE MASS MEDIA 169 (1977)).
37
See id at 574.
38
See Peter Jubb, Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation, 21 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 77
(1999).
39
See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle in Corporate Fraud, 65.6
J. OF FIN. 2213, 2214-7 (2010). See also John A. Martin and James G. Combs, Does it Take A Village to
Raise a Whistleblower, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 83, 84 (May 2011).
40
See Janet P. Near and Marcia P. Miceli, Whistleblowing: Myth and Reality, 22.3 J. MGMT. 507-526
(1996) (including a literature review of pre-1996 research on whistleblower attributes, including personality
31

8
professional status, long service, a more positive attitude toward their jobs, and a
likelihood of having won a performance award in the previous two years were predictors
of whistleblowing.41 A more recent meta-analysis of whistleblower research suggests that
some of these antecedents may be more related to a whistleblower’s access to
information about wrongdoing as opposed to attributes of whistleblowing.42 Under either
analysis, the result is a subset of well-placed employees with access to relevant
information.
The second prerequisite to a whistleblower functioning as a private monitor is a
sufficient incentive to act. Research indicates that whistleblowers likely have mixed
motives.43 Some are motivated to help themselves individually, and some are motivated
to assist other people, be it colleagues, related parties, or society generally.44 It is difficult
to determine actual whistleblower motivation because what potential whistleblowers say
about what motivates them to blow the whistle may differ from what actually motivates
them.45 Research has shown, however, what is likely to inhibit people from blowing the
whistle. A study of more than 3,000 respondents indicated that the most common reasons
for failing to blow the whistle are the perceptions that nothing could or would be done
about the wrongdoing.46 When wrongdoing is reported, many whistleblowers must blow
the whistle more than once because the first attempt is often ineffective.47 Indeed,
variables); Jessica R. Mesmer-Mangus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations:
An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions and Retaliations, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS
277-297 (2005) (including a meta analysis of whistleblower personality variables for pre-2005 research);
Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?: Recent US
Research on the Factors Associated with Whistleblowing, at 81-84 in DAVID B. LEWIS, A GLOBAL
APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE (2010) (summarizing whistleblower attribute research
through 2010).
41
See Terry Morehead Dworkin and Janet P. Near, A Better Statutory Approach to Whistleblowing, 7.1
BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 67-7 (1997)
42
See Marcia P. Miceli, Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter, Predicting Employee
Reactions to Perceived Organizational Wrongdoing: Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and
Whistleblowing, 65.8 HUM. REL. 923, 945 (2012).
43
See Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter, and Marcia P. Miceli, Does Type of
Wrongdoing Affect the Whistleblowing Process, 14.2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 219, 220 (2004) (citing J.B. Dozier
and Marcia P. Miceli, Potential Predictors of Whistleblowing: A Prosocial Behavior Perspective, 10 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 823-36 (1985); MARCIA P. MICELI AND JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES (1992); D. Bash and T.
Friedlen, FBI Agent Blows Whistle on Moussaoui Probe: “I Had to Do What I Believed Was Right,
CNN.COM (2002)). See also Siddharta Dasgupta and Ankit Kesharwani, Whistleblowing: A Survey of
Literature, 9.4 IUP J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 1, 6 (2010) (summarizing the literature on the motivations of
whistleblowers).
44
See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?, supra note __ at
77. See also Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission, Opening Statement at
Securities Exchange Commission Open Meeting, Item 2 Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm (stating that whistleblowers come
forward to right a wrong).
45
See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?, supra note __ at
80.
46
See Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli, supra note __ at 237-8.
47
See Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis, An Examination of the Layers of Workplace Influences in
Ethical Judgments: Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting, 93 J. OF BUS.
ETHICS 21, 22 (2010).
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external whistleblowers usually attempt to blow the whistle internally first. 48
C. Tax Whistleblowers
As with whistleblowers generally, tax whistleblowers appear well-placed.49 They may
be motivated by the Service’s monetary awards for tips that generate revenue, potential
grants of immunity for their own culpable conduct, their own morals, other
considerations, or some combination thereof. Based on prior research of whistleblowers
generally, tax whistleblowers will not be motivated if they perceive that the Service is
unlikely or unwilling to act upon their information.50 As such, positive public perception
of the Service’s willingness to act and effectiveness are critical to a functional program.
The effectiveness of tax whistleblower tips is not easy to ascertain but shows
empirical promise. The only information available on the effectiveness of tax
whistleblowers is from a prior program that had drawn only a dozen tips involving more
than $2 million. 51 Under these limited circumstances, examinations involving
whistleblowers raised nearly twice as much revenue per hour as examinations flagged
through traditional methods. 52 Whistleblower involvement in an examination also
lowered the percentage of examinations resulting in no additional revenue.53 Simply put,
a successful examination involving a whistleblower tip raised, on average, more revenue
than one without a whistleblower tip. This data suggests that whistleblowers can be a
cost-effective tool to counteract the inherent information asymmetry the Service faces;
however, the direct applicability of this data is limited because it involves a small,
predecessor whistleblower program with significantly different processes, available
bounties, and public awareness. What we can take from this data is that when a good
whistleblower tip is actually used in an examination, it increases the efficiency and
productivity of an examination.
The ultimate objective of any tax whistleblower program should be to improve tax
enforcement and collection through more efficient examinations. To that end, the Service
needs policies that assist in fulfilling the theoretical and practical promise of
48

See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up, supra note __ at 84
(“Most whistleblowers use internal channels to report wrongdoing; the majority of those who use external
channels have first used internal channels.”).
49
Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy of the Service’s whistleblower program means that the only
current data publicly available on whistleblower claims is that in the Service’s Whistleblower Office annual
report to Congress. See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT. THe report gives no information on
tax whistleblower identities, attributes or motivations. As such, we must rely on the available social
science data about whistleblower generally to opine about tax whistleblowers. The authors know of no
reason, however, to believe that tax whistleblowers differ in any material way from other whistleblowers.
50
See supra Part I.B.
51
See TIGTA 2006 Report, supra note ___.
52
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS' REWARD PROGRAM NEEDS
MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT (2006), [hereinafter TIGTA 2006 Report]
http://www.treasury.gov/ tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf.
See also Edward Morse,
Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 24 AKRON TAX J.
1, 11-13 (2009) (interpreting the 2006 TIGTA report data).
53
See Morse, supra note __.
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whistleblower assistance. The next Part discusses how the Service interacts with
whistleblowers and concludes with a discussion of troubling policies that underuse
whistleblowers.
II. WHISTLEBLOWER TIP PROCESSING AND DEBRIEFING
The following Part identifies the Service’s policies for interacting with
whistleblowers. After briefly noting the origins of the modern tax whistleblower
program, 54 Part II describes how the Service receives information from whistleblowers
and the breakdowns in the processing of tax whistleblower tips.55
A. Program History and Statutory Basis
Prior to the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,56 the Service paid whistleblower
awards under a discretionary system.57 The still-codified provision gave the Service
complete discretion over all whistleblower awards, including discretion over the decision
whether to pay and the amount of any whistleblower award.58 The Service’s complete
discretion over payment resulted in uncertainty for whistleblowers until the 2006
overhaul to the Whistleblower Program.59
The 2006 statutory changes created an additional provision that authorizes a 15 to 30
percent award from the collected proceeds if the tip alleges business tax delinquencies of

54

See infra Part I.A.
For the purposes of this article, the authors define tax whistleblower claims as those eligible for
awards under I.R.C. § 7623. Other individuals are, of course, permitted to provide anonymous tips to the
Service regarding delinquent taxpayers. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 3949A (form on which to
provide non-award tips to the Service). The focus of this article, however, lies with the Service’s collection
of tips from employee whistleblowers and subject to § 7623.
56
See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2958 (2006)
(amending I.R.C. § 7623).
57
See Kwon, supra note __ at n.15 (noting that courts had historically given the Service discretion
whether or not to pay a whistleblower award and how much such award should be). See also Dennis J.
Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 362 (2008) (discussing the prior law to
determine awards based on the discretion of the District Director); Davis-Nozemack and Webber,
supra note __ at 83 (explaining that the codification of I.R.C. § 7623 authorized a discretionary payout
system).
58
Currently, the Service’s discretion is limited to small whistleblower awards that fall below the
minimum dollar thresholds. See I.R.C. § 7623(a) (“The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems necessary for (1) detecting underpayments of tax, or
(2) detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or
conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided for by law.”). See also
INTERNAL REV. SERV., Internal Revenue Code IRC 7623(a), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Internal-RevenueCode-IRC-7623(a), (“The award is at the discretion of the Service; there is no requirement that an award be
issued; The discretionary award is based on additions to tax, penalties, and other amounts collected as a
result of administrative or judicial action resulting from the information provided. No minimum statutory
award percentage; No appeal provisions.”)
59
See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note __ at 87 (commenting on the 2006 changes to the
Whistleblower Program as providing some certainty for award valuations that was not present under the
prior discretionary system that still exists in section 7623(a)).
55
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$2,000,000 or more.60 Congress also removed the prior $10 million award cap in an
attempt to attract whistleblowers to report large tax evasion and fraud. 61 Congress
combined a high threshold for tax whistleblower claims with much needed award
certainty to focus the Program on high dollar tax abuse cases.62 Congress intended the
result to be a Whistleblower Program that seeks maximum revenues with minimal
program expenses.63
The certainty provided to whistleblowers under the 2006 statutory changes only exists
on the surface, however. In execution, the Whistleblower Program offers little certainty
to whistleblowers.
B. Lifecycle of a Whistleblower Tip
The Service has created a process for managing whistleblower tips and resulting
taxpayer examinations or investigations. In theory, this approach involves a detailed plan
for processing the whistleblower tips with set processing time guidelines. Unfortunately,
the Service’s implementation of this plan has been heavily criticized for
underperformance.
1. Whistleblower Tips in Theory
The Service’s process for administering whistleblower claims is outlined in detail in
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).64 Exhaustive detail is not needed for the purposes of
this article. What is important, however, is an understanding of the basic processing of a
tax whistleblower tip.
Whistleblowers must submit tips in writing to the Service’s Whistleblower Office.65
Once the Whistleblower Office completes an administrative and cursory substantive
review of the tip, the tip is sent to the Service’s relevant operating division for a
comprehensive substantive evaluation.66 The operating division has complete discretion
over the process.67 The division may or may not debrief a whistleblower,68 and it may or
60

See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (“an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) resulting from the action
(including any related actions) or from any settlement in response to such action”).
61
See Blake Ellis, Rat Out a Tax Cheat, Collect a Reward, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar, 3, 2010) (quoting
Stephen Whitlock as stating that “many claims are for substantially more than the $2 million threshold and
involve businesses or very wealthy individuals.”).
62
See Tom Herman, Tipster Rewards Require Patience, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2007, at D3
(observing that Congress intended the promise of larger rewards would attract better quality tips and help
reduce the tax gap).
63
See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note __ at 87.
64
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1 et seq.
65
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.3, Submission of Information for Award under Sections 7623(a) or (b) (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010).
66
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.4, Initial Review of the Form 211 by the Whistleblower Office (as amended Jun.
18, 2010).
67
Upon initial review, the whistleblower analyst may forward the submission to the criminal
investigation division. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(2) and (3), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for
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may not act on the tip by beginning (or continuing) an examination of the taxpayer’s
return(s).69 Only after tax proceeds have been collected and the two-year refund statute of
limitations has run 70 will the Whistleblower Office evaluate the whistleblower’s
contribution and pay an award.71 For many reasons, not the least of which is that a tax
whistleblower may only be compensated from proceeds that the Service actually collects
from the taxpayer, 72 the process may take the better part of a decade for a
whistleblower.73
2. Whistleblower Tips In Practice – Cultural Resistance and Processing Burdens
Whistleblower attorneys have complained about the lengthy process and specifically
about processing delays. 74 At least one current tip has spent over six years under
examination.75 Lengthy processing times could be due to the complexity of some cases,
but they are exacerbated by the Service’s current incentive structure and cultural bias
against aggressively pursuing whistleblower cases.76 The Service’s operating divisions
have total discretion to act to upon any whistleblower tip.77 In other words, the division
Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). If the tip is not used for a criminal investigation, the Operating Division
applicable to the taxpayer reviews it for use. For example, a tip involving a small employer would be
referred to the Small Business/Self-Employed division, whereas a tip involving a larger employer or a
multi-national corporation would be referred to Large Business and International division. See I.R.M.
25.2.2.6(4) and (6), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010);
I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(2) and (5), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as amended Jun. 18,
2010).
68
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(10) and (11), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended
Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(7) and (10), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010) (noting that a debriefing will take place “[u]nless the SME determines that a
debriefing is unlikely to result in information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission,
the SME will debrief the whistleblower.”). See also Dalrymple Memo, supra note __ (requiring only that
LB&I, TEGE, and SBSE provide a reason for failing to debrief).
69
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(13) – (15), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended
Jun. 18, 2010).
70
The payor of the tax proceeds may waive the right to a refund or settle, eliminating the need for the
two-year window. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (as amended Jun. 18, 2010).
71
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(14) through (20), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(16) through (18), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for
Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.8, Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Award Computation (as amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M.
25.2.2.12, Funding Awards (as amended Jun. 18, 2010).
72
See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (“such individual shall…receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more
than 30 percent of the collected proceeds ….”).
73
See Morse, supra note __ at 11-13. See also Jesse Drucker and Peter S. Green, IRS Resists WhistleBlowers Despite Wide U.S. Tax Gap, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-19/irs-resists-whistleblowers-despite-wide-u-s-tax-gap.html.
74
See infra n. _ -__.
75
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT, supra note __ at tbl 5.
76
See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Whistleblower Office Making Improvements, TAX NOTES (Feb. 27, 2012)
(quoting Whitlock as stating “the audit process for high-dollar cases takes longer, given their complexities
and the opportunities for taxpayers to appeal.”).
77
See Jeremiah Coder, The Whistleblower Whipsaw Process, TAX NOTES (Mar. 11, 2013) (noting that
the Service determines whether or not it will act on a tip from a whistleblower and whistleblowers do not
have a path to appeal if their information is ignored).
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can choose to ignore a tip. Even if a tip is accepted, the Service does not give
whistleblower cases any higher priority. Agents have no greater incentive to act upon
whistleblower cases than other cases.78 Whistleblower cases are not a policy priority and
may encounter cultural resistance within the Service.79 While recent Service executives
have expressed support for the whistleblower program,80 previous Service executives
have publicly expressed disdain for the program.81 The Service has a long-standing
closed-door policy with respect to its examinations and has limited involvement from
non-Service individuals. 82 The presence of a whistleblower changes this cultural
dynamic by adding an “outsider” into an examination. As society has embraced
whistleblowers, the Service has not yet caught up culturally.
The Program has recently received significantly more tips but has struggled to
process them.83 The whistleblower process itself has additional steps in comparison to

78

Andrew Velarde, ‘Miller Memo’ Seen as Improving IRS Whistleblower Process, TAX NOTES (Oct. 7,
2013) (quoting Harvey as saying “There needs to be a lot of thinking about how you provide incentives to
the field agents to take the whistleblower information, ‘maybe in a situation where they already know about
a particular issue, but they don’t have the proverbial smoking gun,’ he said. ‘There may be some
institutional bias at the lower levels of the IRS.’”).
79
See Erika Kelton, IRS Cheats Taxpayers By Ignoring Whistleblowers, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2014) (noting
that “The root of the problem is the anti-whistleblower attitude ingrained in the IRS culture- a status quo
that no IRS commissioner has attempted to change…”); Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers See Little
Reward, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012) (noting that “…the IRS Whistleblower Office does its best but faces stiff
headwinds form the IRS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC), which has stymied the whistleblower program by
interpreting the 2006 law in ways that discourage whistleblowers and undermine the program’s potential
for success”); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS Whistleblower Program for Award Delays, TAX NOTES
(Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Knott, Zerbe, Grassley, and Skarlatos remarking on cultural resistance to working
whistleblowers).
80
See Douglas Shulman, Remarks Before 21st Annual George Washington University International
Tax Conference (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Remarks-of-Commissioner-DouglasShulman-before-the-21st-Annual-George-Washington-University-International-Tax-Conference
(“Using
informants is another part of our toolkit. . . . Some of these have become big money cases.”). See also Paul
Bonner, Tax From the Top: Q&A With IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman, J. ACCT. (Apr. 2010) (quoting
Shulman as stating “It’s still relatively new but an important tool for tax administration. . . . But I’m a big
fan of the program. It can help us identify fraud or tax noncompliance we would have never known
about.”), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/apr/20102509.htm. See also Gretchen
Morgensen, Sounding the Tax Alarm, to Little Applause N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2014) (stating Commissioner
Koskinen was a “fan” of the whistleblower program and stressing the importance of a tax system where
everyone is paying their share).
81
See Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Donald Korb, TAX NOTES (Jan. 19, 2010) (quoting Korb as
stating “The new whistle-blower provisions Congress enacted a couple of years ago have the potential to be
a real disaster for the tax system. I believe that it is unseemly in this country to encourage people to turn in
their neighbors and employers to the IRS as contemplated by this particular program. The IRS didn't ask for
these rules; they were forced on it by the Congress.”).
82
See Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations of the
Internal Revenue Laws: Public Hearing on Proposed Regulation 26 C.F.R. Part 301 (Apr. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations] (testimony of Erica Brady, noting the Service
has been plagued by criticism that the Service does not welcome whistleblowers, and testimony of Tom
Pliske, acknowledging the Service is constrained by privacy limitations and therefore does not disclose
taxpayer information).
83
See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note ___ at 89-93 (noting the TIGTA and GAO reports
regarding IRS Whistleblower Office struggles).
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non-whistleblower examinations, 84 and consequently examinations involving
whistleblowers may experiences delays that non-whistleblower cases do not. For
example, whistleblower cases must spend time in the whistleblower office for screening
and referral, then with a subject matter expert, and also may undergo a review by chief
counsel’s office for privileged documents or other issues.85
During the last year, the whistleblower office and some areas of the Service have
improved the processing time for tips; however, tips still spend an inordinate amount of
time in process overall.86 Many whistleblower attorneys complain that delay is often
caused during a tip’s time with subject matter experts and chief counsel’s office.87 Tips
are with a subject matter expert for evaluation for more than six months (on average), and
one currently open tip has spent over three years with a subject matter expert.88 A
whistleblower attorney has reported that delays of more than a year are common for tips
undergoing subject matter expert evaluation.89
It is unclear whether additional time for these functions results in a more efficient
examination. It is clear that the administrative procedures overburden the Whistleblower
Program. Delays, with which the program appears peppered, create the danger of statute
of limitations expiration.90 If whistleblowers perceive tip processing is prolonged, there is
84

See Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS Whistleblower Program for Award Delays, TAX NOTES (Sept.
19, 2011) (acknowledging that “the demands on subject matter experts’ time, review of information for
applicable privilege, and arranging debriefings with whistleblowers all add to how long a claim may be in
process”).
85
See id.
86
Compare WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT, at tbl 5, with WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY
2012 REPORT at tbl 3. See also Press Release from Senator Charles Grassley (Jun. 21, 2012) [hereinafter
Grassley 2012 Press Release] (discussing the Service’s acknowledgment of lengthy processing of
whistleblower claims).
87
See Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows Whistleblowers Off Course, TAX NOTES (May 21,
2012) (quoting one practitioner as stating “’There are nice people running the IRS Whistleblower Office,
but no one seems to want to make hard decisions and ruffle feathers of those in chief counsel or other parts
of the IRS opposed to the program.’”); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as
stating “’the IRS’s use of subject matter experts has been inefficient in evaluating whistleblower claims.”).
88
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT at tbl 5 (the text accompanying table 5 notes that the
“data collection . . . did not consider the possibility that a claim may not move through the process linearly.
For example, the claim reported as “longest” in operating division subject matter expert status was
transferred for consideration of a field examination after completion of a criminal investigation.”
Nonetheless, the report includes no information about the tip that spent the longest “linear” time in the
process.)
89
See Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as stating “’When
I asked a subject matter expert why it took so long to get the debrief meeting set up, his response was ‘This
has only been on my desk for a year,’’ Lynam said, adding that the answer ‘boggles the mind. It shouldn’t
take multiple years to determine whether a submission has merit,’ he said.’”).
90
Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows, supra note __ (commenting that whistleblower
advocates and their clients are unhappy with the lack of set deadlines for Service response times in the
whistleblower statutes); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as stating “’No
one needs three years to determine if a case could be valid. In point of pact, waiting three years pretty
much ensures that it won’t be because the statute of limitations would have expired,’ Lynam said. ‘If a
revenue agent lets the statute of limitations run on an exam, there would be significant consequences,
including potential job termination. But if the subject matter expert or chief counsel employee lets the
statute of limitations run, it is just another day at the office.’”).
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a risk that whistleblowers will not step forward and submit tips. There have been a
number of calls for revisions to the IRS Whistleblower Program,91 and the Service has
publicly acknowledged the Program “isn’t where we would like it yet.”92
C. Service’s Approach to Debriefing
One of the places ripe for revision is in whistleblower information intake. Currently,
the Service accepts only written tips.93 Without interviewing a whistleblower, the Service
has only written statements and submitted documents with which to work. Relying solely
on written submissions unnecessarily limits the Service’s access to information about the
taxpayer and the whistleblower. Debriefing, otherwise known as interviewing, can allow
the Service to better ascertain the veracity of the whistleblower and any motivations for
tip submission. In addition, debriefing allows the Service to explicitly explore the
relationship between the whistleblower and taxpayer to flesh out any potential legal
issues related to tip receipt. Specifically, privilege, Fourth and Sixth Amendment pose
potential issues but are not likely to be identified by the written submission. Debriefing
also serves as a way for the whistleblower to provide expert-like guidance to the Service
as it examines sophisticated business transactions.
For the past six years, the Service’s policy for interviewing whistleblowers has been
in flux. Prior to 2008, the Service did not have any policy expressly governing

91

See e.g., Press Release from Senator Charles Grassley (Sept. 9, 2011) 2011 Tax Notes Today 176-60
[hereinafter Grassley 2011 Press Release] (advocating for suggestions recommended by a GAO report on
the Whistleblower Program); Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Douglas Shulman,
Commissioner,
Internal
Revenue
Serv.
(Sept.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.rewardtax.com/files/grassleylettertoshulman9_13_11.pdf [hereinafter Grassley Letter to
Shulman] (arguing that funds received from whistleblower tips can more than pay for improvements
necessary for the Program to grow in its success); Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to
Douglas Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., & Timothy Geithner, Secretary, Dep’t of
Treasury, (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Document_.pdf
[hereinafter Grassley Letter to Shulman and Geithner] (reiterating his concerns that the Service is not
implementing recommendations from the GAO although the Service has access to funds to do so); Grassley
2012 Press Release, (requesting an accounting from the Commissioner of the IRS regarding flawed
implementation of the IRS Whistleblower Program) available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/;
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-683, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS
IRS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND ENHANCE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION (Aug.
2011) at 26 [hereinafter 2011 GAO Report] (listing recommendations for executive action to improve the
processing of whistleblower claims); Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers Should See New Tone at the Top,
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2012) http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2012/10/11/irs-whistleblowers-shouldsee-new-tone-at-the-top/ (discussing the lack of attention the Whistleblower Program was receiving from
the former head of the Service and a change in leadership at the Service could improve the Service’s
Whistleblower Program).
92
See Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, UBS Whistle-Blower Secures $104 Million Award from
IRS, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2012). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/ubs-whistle-blowerbirkenfeld-secures-irs-award-lawyers-say.html (citing 2012 interview with IRS Deputy Commissioner for
Services and Enforcement Steven Miller).
93
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 211, APPLICATION FOR AWARD FOR ORIGINAL INFORMATION
(2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f211.pdf. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 3949-A,
INFORMATION REFERRAL (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f3949a.pdf.
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interviews with whistleblowers.94 In 2008, the Service’s policy, as announced by Chief
Counsel Notice, 95 articulated a “one bite rule.”96 The policy limited staff to a single
interview and document collection from an employee whistleblower. 97 The Notice
reasoned that, if the government was a “passive recipient of information and did not
encourage or acquiesce” in a whistleblower’s conduct, then the government would be
able to use a whistleblower’s information and any of the fruits of that information without
tainting it.98
Two years later, the Service amended its 2008 Notice for civil tax matters. 99
Arguably, the Service continued its 2008 “one bite rule” with respect to criminal
matters.100 In the revised 2010 Notice, the Service continued to suggest that it remain a
passive recipient of information;101 however, the Service added a very brief analysis of
applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.102 The Service included a two-factor test103
for determining whether a private party’s search would be imputed to the government,
and subsequently barred by the exclusion rule. 104 While the added legal analysis
94

The authors could find no published Service policy relating to whistleblower interviews issued
before 2008.
95
See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2008-011, Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current
Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 27, 2008) at 1-2.
96
Although the Chief Counsel’s Office expressed the one bite rule policy, the 2008 Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) contained a broader policy. It contemplated that the Service “will debrief a whistleblower”
in § 7623(b) claims “unless the [Subject Matter Expert] determines that a debriefing is unlikely to result in
information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission.” See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(5) Processing
Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as amended Dec. 30, 2008). Although the Service circulated two
different policies during this time period, it appears, based on whistleblower attorneys’ statements during
this time, that the Service was using the one bite policy. See Janet Novack and William P. Barnett, Tax
Informants
are
on
the
Loose,
FORBES
(Nov.
24,
2009)
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1214/investment-guide-10-ubs-irs-spondello-tax-informants-onloose.html (“One big issue in this case is the so-called one-bite rule, an IRS directive that says the agency
can be a one-time passive recipient of documents an informant brings from a target but can’t have him go
back and take more documents.”). See also Michael Hudson, Red Tape, Old Guard Slow Whistleblowing on
Corporate
Tax
Cheats,
TUSCON
SENTINEL
(Jun.
22,
2011)
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/report/062211_irs_whistleblowers/red-tape-old-guard-slowwhistleblowing-corporate-tax-cheats/ (quoting Erika Kelton as stating “One stalled case . . . involves
hundreds of millions of dollars in tax cheating by a Wall Street bank . . .. The case is stuck in some review
process, and it’s been like that for two years even though the whistleblower has offered further help. He
could help them break through some of the issues in a 45-minute meeting. But the IRS has refused to meet
with him.”).
97
See id.
98
Id. While the Notice permitted one time only contact with employee whistleblowers, the Notice
completely barred the receipt of any information from whistleblowers who represented the taxpayer before
the Service or in litigation in which the Service has an interest. See id. at 2.
99
See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2010-004, Clarification of CC Notice 2008-011 Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 17, 2010) at 2.
100
See id. at 1 (addressing policy with respect to civil matters only).
101
See id. at 2.
102
See id. at 1-2.
103
See id (“Generally, courts focus on two factors: (1) the government's knowledge of, and
acquiescence in, the search and seizure, and (2) the intent of the party conducting the search and seizure.
(citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981))).
104
See id.
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undoubtedly helps Service personnel in understanding the issues and stakes of
whistleblower interviews, the most important change of the Notice was a slight loosening
of the “one bite rule” for employee whistleblowers.105 Instead of nearly wholesale
prohibition on subsequent whistleblower contact, the Service expressly allowed an
employee whistleblower to submit supplemental information if it was for the “sole
purpose of clarifying previously submitted information” and “reasonably relate[s] to the
previously submitted information.”106 The Service would consider any new information
from an employee whistleblower that related to a new issue as a new whistleblower
claim.107 Despite the permissive language for whistleblower contact within the 2010
Notice, the Notice’s tone still dissuaded communication with whistleblowers and warned
Service employees about contact with whistleblowers. While the 2010 Notice appears,
on its face, to slightly liberalize whistleblower contact policy, greater whistleblower
communication does not appear to have happened in practice.108
The 2010 Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”)109 added a “Debriefing Checksheet,”110
but it fails to live up to its title. The Checksheet seeks to ensure that the veracity and
voluntary provision of the whistleblower’s information. 111 It also warns the
whistleblower that the Service may not use the information, but if it does, the issue may
take years to resolve, and that any award is taxable.112 Finally, the Checksheet promises
confidentiality for the whistleblower’s identity. This Checksheet essentially serves the
purpose of legal protection for the Whistleblower Program. The Debriefing Checksheet
provides nothing other than a legal coverage to the Service in the event of a dispute with
the whistleblower on any of the above-mentioned issues. It provides very little
investigative assistance.
During the following two years, the Service received correspondence critical of the
Whistleblower Program from Senator Charles Grassley.113 His criticism centered on the
Service’s policies and procedures for consuming whistleblowers tips.114 Perhaps due to
105

See id. at 2.
Id.
107
See id. at 3. The Service’s prohibition against accepting tips from taxpayer representatives remained
the same. See id.
108
See Druker and Green, supra note __ (stating that the IRS is reluctant to talk directly to
whistleblowers.). See also Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers See Little Reward, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2012/03/02/irs-whistleblowers-see-little-reward/ (acknowledging
the frustration of whistleblowers that the Service has not utilized the whistleblowers’ expertise and allowed
the whistleblowers to assist in a limited role in the investigation).
109
Chief Counsel amended its whistleblower debriefing policy in 2010, and another version of the
IRM whistleblower provisions were also adopted. Similar to the 2008 version, the 2010 IRM contemplated
debriefing whistleblowers, stating “[u]nless the examiner/team determines that a debriefing is unlikely to
result in information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission, the examiner/team will
debrief the whistleblower.” I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(10) Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award, (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010).
110
See I.R.M. Exhibit 25.2.2-4 Debriefing Checksheet (as amended Jun. 18, 2010).
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
See Grassley Letter to Shulman, supra note __; Grassely Letter to Shulman and Geithner, supra
note __; Grassley 2011 Press Release, supra note __; Grassley 2012 Press Release, supra note __.
114
See id.
106

18
this criticism, the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement distributed a
memo encouraging Service personnel to accept and use whistleblower tips.115 In a June
2012 memo, the Deputy Commissioner expressed an “expectation that debriefing will be
the rule not the exception.”116 He reasoned that “debriefing [a whistleblower] . . . is an
important component of the evaluation of whistleblower information prior to a decision
on whether the information should be referred to the field for audit or investigation.”117
This memo appears to mark a policy shift for the Service’s interaction with
whistleblowers. Unlike previous Chief Counsel Notices, the memo made no distinctions
between non-employee whistleblowers, employee whistleblowers, or taxpayer
representatives. Indeed, the memo lacked any specificity whatsoever. It appears to be a
blanket statement of intention.118
In August 2014, a new Deputy Commissioner issued a strong statement in favor of
debriefing, but it too lacked specificity on the use of debriefing.119 The recent Memo
uses mandatory language, “all whistleblower submission referred for subject matter
expert (SME) review . . . will include debriefing of the whistleblower”; however, there is
only a nominal enforcement mechanism. The failure to debrief merely requires
documentation of the reasoning for declining a debriefing.120
While the 2012 and 2014 Memos are steps toward more debriefing, the Service has
left its personnel without any guidance for implementing the Memos’ good intentions.
Without specificity and guidance, the Service risks falling back into cultural reluctance to
debriefing whistleblowers. A general reluctance to engage with third parties may be
well-suited for typical examinations and helpful for protecting taxpayer privacy;
however, whistleblower involvement necessitates another approach. In particular, the
Service should be more willing to take a critical look at its debriefing policies.
III. PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO WHISTLEBLOWER DEBRIEFING
When the Service receives a whistleblower tip, the Service cannot simply open a
dialogue amongst all of the parties. The Service is required by statute to protect
taxpayer’s privacy, 121 and the Service also recognizes that it should protect a
whistleblower’s anonymity. 122 The Service must also respect a taxpayer’s Fourth
115

See Miller Memo supra note __.
See id.
117
See id.
118
Nonetheless, the Deputy Commissioner’s statement appears to temporally correlate with a change
in Service action. Compare id (issued on June 20, 2012), with 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed
Regulations (statement of Scott Oswald) (“And so in the interviews we’ve had with IRS examiners, when
its gone into enforcement, its really this one-way type of conversation, and these have occurred, I think,
with some regularity, since July.”). A whistleblower attorney’s testimony indicates that the Service has
been debriefing more whistleblowers recently; the testimony also implied that debriefing increased after the
2012 Memo. See 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations, supra note __.
119
See Dalrymple Memo, supra note __.
120
See id. (“or a specific justification for a decision not to conduct a debriefing.”
121
I.R.C. §6103
122
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.11(1), Confidentiality of the Whistleblower (as amended Jun. 18, 2010) (“The
IRS will protect the identity of the whistleblower to the fullest extent permitted by the law.”); See also
116
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Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. These requirements may
appear to constrain the Service; however, a closer examination reveals the circumstances
of their invocation to be a rare occurrence in civil tax matters. The reality is that these
issues are navigable for the Service.
A. Fourth Amendment Implications in Whistleblower Debriefing
The following analyzes the legal framework, consequences and likelihood of
violating a taxpayer’s Fourth Amendment rights.
1. The Fourth Amendment Applies Only to Governmental Searches
As a federal agency, the Service must respect a taxpayer’s constitutional rights,
including a taxpayer’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.123 The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . ..”124
While the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the expectation of privacy that
society has established for both individuals and businesses,125 the Fourth Amendment has
limited applicability to whistleblowers. It only prohibits taxpayers from unreasonable
search and seizure by the government.126 Fourth Amendment protection of a person’s
privacy does not extend protection against search and seizure by private individuals.127
Other laws protect against privacy violations such as trespass, burglary, and
eavesdropping by private individuals.
Kwon, supra note 21 at n.312 (2010) (citing I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, § 3.06; Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 672, 676 (1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the informer privilege permits the government to
withhold the identity of ‘persons who furnish information of violation of law to officers charged with
enforcement of that law’ to encourage the flow of information to the government)).
123
See Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (noting that businesses, like individuals, have
Fourth Amendment rights (citing See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967))). See also United States v.
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 726 (5th Cir. 1997).
124
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
125
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (noting the expectation of privacy (citing
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-1 (1983); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 739-41 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968))). See also See Marshall, 436
U.S. at 307 (noting that businesses, like individuals, have Fourth Amendment rights (citing See v. Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967))).
126
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“The amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion . . ..”). As the Supreme Court made clear in 1921, the
Fourth Amendment does not limit search and seizure by anyone other than the government. See Burdeau v
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (stating “The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it
was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.”).
127
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
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Generally, a whistleblower may give another’s information or property to the
government without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Many individuals do not
appreciate the possibility that a confidant may disclose his or her secrets or give his or her
property to the government. When confiding in another, a person “assumes the risk that
his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities . . ..”128 Breach of confidence
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.129 This is true even if the information was
shared only for limited purposes and with the assumption that the information would
remain confidential.130
2. An Exception for Governmental Instruments
As a private party, the whistleblower may violate the Fourth Amendment if the
whistleblower is regarded as having acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the state . . ..”131
When an individual is an instrument of the government, the individual’s actions are
credited to the government. With this exception, an unreasonable search by a private
individual, which would ordinarily not implicate the Fourth Amendment, becomes an
unreasonable search by the government.
a. The Two-Factor Test
The Supreme Court has stated that “whether a private party should be deemed an
agent or instrument of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns
on the degree of the Government’s participation in the private party’s activities.”132 The
Supreme Court resolves the question of governmental agency or instrumentality in light
of all the circumstances,133 and it has offered no bright line test.134 Because the issue is
so fact determinative, Courts’ of Appeals analysis offers more instruction for determining
a cohesive view. All but the Second, Third and Federal circuits have utilized a two-factor
test to determine whether a whistleblower is a government instrument.135 The first factor
128

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. See also Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux:
Internet Search Records and the Case for a ‘Crazy Quilt’ of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 U.C.L.A.
J. L. & TECH. 2, 9 (2007) (citing Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528
(2006), Phillip H. Marcus, A Fourth Amendment Gag Order – Upholding Third Party Searches at the
Expense of First Amendment Freedom of Association Guarantees, 47. U. PITT. L. REV. 257, 276 (1985)).
129
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (the
Fourth Amendment does not “discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the
apprehension of criminals.”) .
130
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. See also Lawless, supra note __ at 9 (citing United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)); Marcus, supra note __ at 276.
131
Id.
132
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (comparing Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1927)).
133
See id. at 614-15(citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487).
134
See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 656-7 (9th Cir. 1982).
135
See United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted) (“ . . . two facts
must be shown. First, the police must have instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. Second, the
individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative
efforts.”). United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344-5 (4th Cir. 2003) (“the Courts of Appeals have
identified two primary factors . . . are (1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the private
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is whether the government knew or acquiesced in the private search. The second factor is
whether the searching party intended to be a government instrument.
i. The First Factor
In most circuits, the first factor examines the government’s acquiescence or
knowledge of the search. 136 These circuits examine whether law enforcement has
“instigated, encouraged, or participated in the search”137 to determine “if the government
coerces, dominates, or directs the actions of a private person’ conducting the search . .
..”138 In looking at government participation under the first factor, courts have allowed
the presence 139 and limited involvement 140 of law enforcement, particularly when
government involvement came after the initial private discovery.141 Courts have even
search, and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to had some
other independent motivation. . . . We too have embraced this two-factor approach, which we have
compressed into ‘one highly pertinent consideration.’”). United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017-8 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“There is no indication from the record (1) that the government knew of or acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct of Willard and Windell, and (2) that Willard and Windell intended to assist law
enforcement efforts in conducting their search.” (citing U.S. v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997)
and noting it is utilized the test in Miller)). United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985) (“ . . .
two factors must be shown. First, the police must have instigated, encouraged or participated in the search.
Second, the individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their
investigative efforts.”). United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Initially, we
determine ‘whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct,’ and secondly ‘whether
the private party’s purpose . . . was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.”). United
States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1982)) (“two critical factors are ‘whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct,’
and ‘whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further [the
informant’s] own ends.’”). Miller, 688 F.2d at 657 (“ . . . we discerned that two critical factors in the
‘instrument or agent analysis are (1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive
conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to
further his own ends.”). United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1242-3 (10th Cir 1996) (quoting Pleasant v.
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Miller, 688 F.2d at 657 (“two important inquiries to aid in
the determination . . . are whether ‘the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and . . .
[whether] the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends.”)).
136
Id. The First and Sixth circuits use a slight variation of the first factor. See Pervaz, 118 F.3d at 5;
Lambert, 771 F.2d at 89.
137
Id.
138
Smythe, 84 F.3d at 1242. The Fourth circuit alone couches its analysis in terms of agency creation.
Specifically, the circuit seeks to “determine whether the requisite agency relationship exists” through a
“fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.” Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344. See
also United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344).
139
See e.g., Smythe, 84 F.3d at 1242 (bus station manager receives suspicious package for shipment
and summons policeman, who is present during manager’s opening of package); Miller, 688 F.2d at 652-4
(FBI agent watched as witness conducted search of property).
140
See e.g., United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004) (police remove suspicious package
from Federal Express conveyor belt and gives it to manager who then opens it); United States v. Hall, 142
F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998) (after initial search by computer technician, trooper requests technician to copy
found, illegal images but copy is never viewed by police or used as basis of later issued warrant);
141
See e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (Federal Express discover white powder
when examining a damaged package and summon DEA agent, who reopens the package and makes a field
test without a warrant).
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allowed small degrees of law enforcement assistance in the search.142 Courts have been
skeptical, however, of ongoing contact or relationships between whistleblowers and the
government. 143 Despite expressing skepticism, courts have allowed governmental
involvement with only a thin veneer of a “wink and a nod.”144 In most published cases,
courts permit the government very wide latitude in dealing with whistleblowers. 145 Even
in cases with judicial admonishments, courts often find a way to admit the contested
evidence.146
While courts are skeptical of ongoing or lengthy relationships between
whistleblowers and the government, the timing of the relationship can mitigate courts’
skepticism. 147 Even though courts prefer that private searches occur before contact with
the government, it is not fatal that a prior search did not occur before the whistleblower’s
contact with the government.148 Courts have given significant latitude to the government
during a search, even going so far as to find a way to allow DEA agents to physically
assist a private searcher in opening contraband.149
142

See United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (DEA agents identified suspicious
package at UPS facility, then encouraged employee to open it, and assisted with actual opening).
143
See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (FBI confidential informant finds
illegal images and then conducts additional searched after talking with law enforcement). See also United
States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (The agent told the whistleblower/hacker that she could
not ask him “to search out cases such as the ones you have sent us. That would make you an agent of the
Federal Government and make how you obtain your information illegal and we could not use it . . . But if
you should happen across such [information] . . . and wish us to look into the matter, please feel free to
send them to us.” Despite characterizing the statements as a “wink and a nod,” the Court permitted the use
of the information because the hacker’s actions did not rise to the level of a government agent.).
144
Id.
145
See United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (1987) (an employee gave records to the Service
over a series of months and the agents arrived at one meeting with a “microfilm copier,” presumably ready
to copy documents that they anticipated from the whistleblower, the Court of Appeals cautioned that the
“IRS agents’ conduct came close to being improper.”).
146
See id.
147
See Jarrett, 338 F.3d. at 346 (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003)). In
Jarrett, the hacker’s evidence was permitted only because the hacker who discovered illegal images on the
defendant’s computer had conducted the illegal search prior to his lengthy email exchanges with an FBI
agent. The Court focused on the timing of the relationship between the hacker and the FBI as a basis for
deeming the search permissible; however, the Court ignored that the hacker had a prior relationship with
the FBI that predated the case. The hacker had been the primary informant in another case involving nearly
the same conduct by both the hacker and the defendant, and the hacker had FBI contact during the prior
case. In an older Seventh Circuit case, an employee kept copies of her employer’s records and later gave
them to the Service but the court focused on the fact that the employee’s search occurred prior to any
contact with the Service’s agents). See United States v. Harper, 458 F.2d 891 (1971) (“Indeed, the records
were acquired eight months prior to her first contact with the agents. In such a situation, the Fourth
Amendment does not require that the evidence be excluded.”). See also United States v. Ziperstein, 601
F.2d 281, 289 (1979) (finding that employee had “gained possession of the documents before his contact
with the FBI”).
148
See United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the government initiated
contact prior to the whistleblower’s disclosure of the documents).
149
See United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). In the published government instrument
cases, courts have given latitude to the FBI and DEA. By and large, the published Fourth Amendment cases
involving government instruments were narcotics or child pornography cases. The accused conduct in
these cases is arguably far more nefarious than that of a garden-variety tax shelter case. It is possible that
the Service may not enjoy such latitude because of the subject matter of its tips. Because courts may not
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ii. The Second Factor
In the two-factor test to determine whether a whistleblower is a government
instrument, the second factor examines the intent of the searching party. More
specifically, the test seeks to ascertain the intent of the party to become a governmental
agent. The Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated that “a party is subject to the [F]ourth
[A]mendment only when he or she has formed the necessary intent to assist in the
government’s investigative or administrative functions; in other words, he or she intends
to engage in a search or seizure.”150
In employee whistleblower cases, the government instrument determination would
typically turn on the first factor, because many tax whistleblowers gather evidence to turn
over to the Service in an effort to bring a taxpayer to justice.151 Other possible scenarios
exist. Some whistleblowers collect evidence to protect themselves and use as bargaining
chips to secure their own immunity. 152 Here, as with the first factor, an ongoing
relationship between a whistleblower and the government is also important albeit for a
different reason. Because the second factor examines a whistleblower’s motivation, a
relationship with the government where the whistleblower is rewarded financially or with
leniency may have bearing. 153 For example, in Walther, the ongoing financial
relationship between the government and the informant seemed persuasive to the court,
and the court deemed the information obtained through Walther informant’s searches
subject to the exclusionary rule. It is unclear, however, whether it is the ongoing
relationship itself or financial motivation that was dispositive to the court. Three circuits
consider the presence of a governmental reward as motivation for a search.154 While these
consider the illegal shelter of income as egregious as the violation of narcotics or child pornography laws,
courts may not be as likely to give the Service the latitude it grants the FBI and DEA. Nonetheless, it is
unlikely that courts would not grant any latitude in tax cases. There is no logic to support granting latitude
to the government in child pornography and narcotics cases but not in tax cases. Accordingly, it follows
that the government will receive at least some latitude when receiving evidence from tax whistleblowers.
150
United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1418 (7th Cir. 1994).
151
See e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2003).
152
See United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (1987). See also Harper, 458 F.2d at 892.
153
Compare United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990) with United States v. Walther,
652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981). In the Eighth Circuit’s Malbrough case, informant Kelley had previously
agreed to participate in three narcotics purchases. In exchange for Kelley’s participation, the police agreed
to refrain from filing burglary charges against Kelley. Without informing the police, Kelley invaded the
defendant’s property on his own accord and brought back information of a marijuana greenhouse to the
police. Although Kelley already had a preexisting relationship as an agent of the government, the court did
not consider his search to be a governmental search in this case because the police never asked Kelley to
seek out marijuana growers and had no knowledge of his actions until afterwards. The Court distinguished
Kelley’s action from those of the informant in Walther. Specifically, the court noted that the government
had routinely paid the Walther informant and that the government had knowingly acquiesced in the Walther
informant’s searches.
154
See Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462 (citing U.S. v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1988)); United
States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-8 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462). See also
U.S. v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Other useful criteria are whether the private actor acted at
the request of the government and whether the government offered the private actor a reward.” (internal
citation omitted)); U.S. v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Other useful criteria are whether the
private actor acted at the request of the government and whether the government offered the private actor a
reward.”); Valdez v. New Mexico, 109 Fed. Appx. 257 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Other considerations are whether
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circuits have noted the reward factor in governmental instrumentality analysis,155 none
have decided a case in which the presence of an award was dispositive.
3. Consequences and the Fourth Amendment
If a whistleblower’s search is deemed an improper governmental search, a taxpayer
may attempt to use the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment’s
protections.156 A taxpayer is unlikely to be successful, however, because the rule is not
typically applied to civil tax matters.
The exclusionary rule “excludes from admission into evidence in federal and state
criminal prosecutions that which is obtained in violation [of the Fourth Amendment] by
unlawful governmental action.”157 The exclusionary rule also applies to evidence that is
“the indirect product or ‘fruit’ “of improperly obtained evidence.158 The exclusionary
rule is not a constitutional guarantee for taxpayers;159 rather, it is a judicial doctrine
designed to deter Fourth Amendment abuses by disallowing evidence.160
If invoked, the exclusionary rule could thwart an ongoing examination. Even in the
event that excluded evidence does not derail an examination, it could create a more
expensive, labor-intensive examination to bring to completion. The Service may also
fear losing, not only a single examination or case, but of harming the ability to examine
that taxpayer in the future. Depending upon the type or scope of evidence excluded, it
may affect more than one tax year or a multitude of items in future years. In addition to
thwarted examinations and extra costs, the Service may also be concerned about publicity
of both its losses to taxpayers and its overreaches. Publicity of unfruitful examinations
could tempt other taxpayers toward noncompliance.161 In addition, the Service’s past
the informant performed the search at the request of the government and whether the government offered a
reward.”). It is not clear why the Malbrough court considered assistance in exchange for a dismissed charge
(that could have resulted in incarceration) as a permissible motivation for assisting the government, while
presumably cash payments are not.
155
See id.
156
See David H. Taylor, Should it Take a Thief? Rethinking the Admission of Illegally Obtained
Evidence in Civil Cases, 22 REV. LITIG. 625, 626-7 (2003).
157
See David H. Taylor, Should it Take a Thief? Rethinking the Admission of Illegally Obtained
Evidence in Civil Cases, 22 REV. LITIG. 625, 626-7 (2003).
158
United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 466 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471
(1963)).
159
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (U.S. 1976) (“The exclusionary rule was a judicially created
means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.”)
160
See id. (“’The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter -- to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the incentive to
disregard it.’” (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (U.S. 1960))).
161
See Joshua Blank, In Defense of Individual Taxpayer Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265 (2011) (“that tax
privacy enables the government to influence individuals' perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by
publicizing specific examples of its tax-enforcement strengths without exposing specific examples of its
tax-enforcement weaknesses. The government publicizes specific examples whenever it reveals the details
of any named individual's tax controversy. Because salient examples may implicate well-known cognitive
biases, this strategic publicity function of tax privacy can cause individuals to develop an inflated
perception of the government's ability to detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a
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overreaches have invited both Congressional and public scrutiny.162
Despite the potential risks of invocation of the exclusionary rule, the rule is very
rarely applied outside the criminal context.163 When it is applied outside of criminal
cases, it is even more rarely applied in civil tax cases. The Court employs a balancing
test164 to determine whether to apply the exclusionary rule “beyond its core [criminal]
application.”165 The Supreme Court balances the cost of frustrated law enforcement with
“additional marginal deterrence” achieved by excluding evidence.166 Some cases have
allowed improperly obtained evidence in criminal investigation to be given to another
agency or sovereign for use in a subsequent civil proceeding. 167 Courts are more
skeptical, however, when the same agency attempts subsequent use in a civil
proceeding,168 but some courts have even allowed the Service to use improperly obtained
evidence in subsequent civil tax proceedings.169 Accordingly, while the list of risks may
seem daunting, the chances that the rule is applied against the Service in a civil tax matter
are very remote.
While the Service must acknowledge, however small the risk, that whistleblower
interactions could violate Fourth Amendment protections, the Service can mitigate any
risk through properly tailored whistleblower policies, which are discussed in Part IV. By
few outliers to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by contrast, individuals could see specific
examples of the government's tax-enforcement weaknesses that would contradict this perception.”).
162
See Chris Stirewalt, Credibility Gap Worsens IRS Scandal, FOX NEWS FIRST, (July 23, 2014)
(commenting on the decreased credibility of IRS Commissioner John Koskinen following claims the
Service
targeted
Obama’s
political
foes)
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/23/credibility-gap-worsens-irs-scandal; Peggy Noonan, This is
No Ordinary Scandal, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2013) (discussing the Service’s scandal targeting conservative
groups as harming the public’s ability to trust); Stop IRS Overreach Act, S.2043, 113th Cong. (2014)
(introduced to prohibit the Service from asking taxpayers questions on religious, political or social beliefs).
163
Compare Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-364 (U.S. 1998) (“Recognizing
these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal
trials.” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (U.S. 1984), United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
447 (U.S. 1976))) and Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 485,
523-524 (2013) (“Finally, many statutes are altogether silent on the question of additional remedies,
including HIPAA, FERPA, COPPA, DNA, DPPA, FCRA, and the IRS Code. Naturally, litigants have
argued that this silence allows for application of the exclusionary rule. For example, defendants have cited
HIPAA regulations' explicit reference to the Fourth Amendment, along with the intimate nature of the
covered material, as support for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for privacy violations by law
enforcement. However, most courts have rejected that contention. The same kinds of arguments have also
been raised and rejected with regard to claims made under FERPA, the DNA Act, FCRA, the Privacy Act,
and the IRS Code.” (internal citation omitted)), with United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (U.S. 1976)
(“Respondent argues, however, that the application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings long has
been recognized in the federal courts. He cites a number of cases.” (internal citations omitted)).
164
See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (U.S. 1976).
165
See United States v. Speck, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8795 *9 (N.D. Ca. 1997).
166
See Janis, at 448, 453. See also Speck, at *10.
167
See e.g., Grimes v. C.I.R., 82 F.3d 286 (9th Cir. 1996), Janis, at 448.
168
See e.g., Tirado v. C.I.R., 689 F.2d 307, 312 (2d Cir. 1982) and Pizzarello v. U.S., 408 F.2d 579,
586 (2d Cir. 1969).
169
See e.g., Weiss v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); Houser v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.
184 (T.C. 1991)
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disseminating clear guidance to personnel on the parameters and the systematic collection
of information designed to flag potential issues before they arise, the Service can create
an effective policy. After all, law enforcement and other federal agencies successfully
work with informants and whistleblowers while avoiding the exclusionary rule.
Debriefing a whistleblower is entirely possible without the fear of tainted evidence.
B. Taxpayer Privacy Implications in Whistleblower Debriefing
Some have claimed that taxpayer privacy inhibits whistleblower debriefing but this
position misunderstands taxpayer privacy law. Taxpayer privacy is an overarching
concern for the Service,170 and this concern carries into the whistleblower area.171 The
following discusses the alternatives available to the Service to facilitate disclosing
taxpayer information to a whistleblower during debriefing.
Taxpayer privacy is generally governed by § 6103, which forbids any federal
employee from disclosing any tax return172 or return information.173 Section 6103’s
broad protection of federal tax information has more than a dozen categorical
exceptions.174 Three of these exceptions could be used by the Service to disclose a
taxpayer’s information to a whistleblower.175 These include exceptions under § 6103(n)
for tax administration contracts, § 6103(k)(6) for an investigative purpose, and §
6103(h)(4) for administrative and judicial proceedings.
1. Tax Administration Contract Exception
Section 6103(n) allows the Service to disclose return information “to any person . . .
170

The Service has been statutorily required to protect taxpayer information since 1976. See Kwon,
supra note __ at n.143 (2010) (citing PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, FEDERAL TAX RETURN
CONFIDENTIALITY, 13-14 (Jun. 1976); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS, VOL. 1: STUDY OF
GENERAL PROVISIONS, 21 (2000); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 313, 314-15 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 1,
335).
171
See Michael Sullivan, Best Practices in Pursuing IRS Whistleblower Claims: an Interview with IRS
Whistleblower Office Director Stephen A. Whitlock, 52 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 81, 90
(2009) (quoting Whitlock as stating “you have to begin by understanding that the IRS puts a premium on
protecting confidentiality. We have statutory requirement to protect the confidentiality of taxpayer returns
and return information is broadly defined. It includes information about the whistleblower, so that’s
taxpayer information within the scope of the statutory protection. And there’s a culture in the IRS about
protecting taxpayer information, so we start from there.”) available at http://www.qui-tamlitigation.com/files/steve_whitlock_interview_with_michael_sulivan_2009.pdf.
172
I.R.C. §6103(b)(1) (defining a tax return as “any tax or information return, declaration of estimated
tax, or claim for refund . . ..”).
173
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (defining return information primarily as “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature,
source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net
worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer’s
return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation . . ..”). See also Blank, supra
note __ at 267 (2011) (citing I.R.C. § 6103 (a), (b)(2), (c)).
174
See I.R.C. § 6103(c) – (o).
175
See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4), (k)(6), (n).
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for the purposes of tax administration.”176 The Service has interpreted “for the purposes
of tax administration” to permit contracts with whistleblowers and has adopted a
regulation governing whistleblower contracts. 177 A close reading of that regulation,
however, describes less of a contract and more of a confidentiality agreement that gives
the Service permission to waive its privacy obligations to a taxpayer and requires a
whistleblower to keep the disclosed information confidential.178 The regulation does not
describe a quid pro quo exchange; rather, it focuses on providing an exception to the
Service’s taxpayer privacy requirement.
Together § 6103(n) and Treasury Regulation § 301.6103(n)-2 provide the Service an
exception to taxpayer privacy that would permit whistleblower debriefing. The Service,
however, has chosen not to utilize this exception. Whistleblower experts have publicly
stated that they are unaware of the Service’s use of a tax administration contract with any
whistleblower,179 and some have questioned if the Service’s reluctance to enter into
contracts with whistleblowers is hindering the Service’s effective pursuit of
whistleblower tips and hampering communication with whistleblowers.180
From the Service’s perspective, § 6103(n) whistleblower contracts offer additional
benefits but certain undesirable consequences. Currently, the Service receives more than
7,500 whistleblower tips annually, suggesting that the Service is not faced with a lack of
tips or incoming flow of information.181 While streamlining and sifting/sorting the
informational flow may be an obstacle for the Service, the Whistleblower Office and the
Service business units likely see little upside to using a contract to gain additional
information given the numerous tips received. It is possible that a contract disclosing
return information to a whistleblower could uncover more substantial tax evasion than the
176

See I.R.C. § 6103(n).
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (describing the Service’s discretion to enter into § 6013(n) contracts
by allowing the Service “to disclose return information to a whistleblower . . . in connection with a written
contract among the [IRS], the whistleblower . . ..”).
178
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (c) (enforcing whistleblower’s confidentiality with civil and criminal
penalty provisions). See also I.R.C. §§ 7431, 7213, and 7213A (penalty provisions).
179
Criticism of the Service’s avoidance of § 6013(n) contracts has come primarily from whistleblower
attorneys who desire a closer, more productive relationship with the Service in hopes of more likely award
payment for their clients. It follows that whistleblower attorneys would seek a formalized relationship
between their clients and the Service to create a legal obligation for award payment. See 2013 Public
Hearing on Proposed Regulations, (statement of Scott Oswald) (commenting that contracts with
whistleblowers have never been entered into and stating that other areas of whistleblower practice utilize
contractual arrangements with the whistleblower and the Service has failed to utilize contractual
relationships although they are authorized to enter into contracts in I.R.C. § 6103(n)).); Letter from Sen.
Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Steven Miller, Acting Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., Hon. Neal
S. Wolin, Acting Secretary, Dept. of Treasury, and Hon. Mark Mazur, Assist. Sec. for Tax Policy, Dept. of
Treasury, (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Grassley Letter to Miller, Wolin and Mazur] (acknowledging the
Service has permission to enter into contracts with whistleblowers yet he was unaware of any instances
where a contract between the Service and a whistleblower was used); Coder, _____, supra note __ (stating
in the final regulations the Service seemed to contemplate the use of a contract with a whistleblower, but it
has not yet used the agreement).
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See Grassley Letter to Miller, Wolin and Mazur, supra note__ (commenting on the lack of
communication and lack of contracts as a failure to use whistleblowers and their advisors resulting in a
crippling of the administration of the program).
181
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2012 REPORT, supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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whistleblower already disclosed or clarify a whistleblower’s previously made disclosures;
however, such additional benefit is speculative. The outcome would not be known until
after the contract had been executed and the disclosure made, which compounds the
uncertainty involving a contract.
In contrast, use of a § 6103 contract has certain consequences for the Service.182
Using a whistleblower contract shifts the relationship balance of power between the
Service and whistleblower. Currently, the Service has greater power in the relationship.
Tax whistleblowers self-identify by submitting a compensable tip.183 There is no other
legal market for the tax tips. A whistleblower could seek compensation for the
information illegally via blackmail, but no other legally permissible market participant
will pay for the whistleblower’s information other than the Service.184 As the only legal
consumer of compensable tips, the balance of power is in the Service’s favor. The
Service’s position is further strengthened because it has complete discretion on whether
to act on the tip.185 It is only after the Service has chosen to pursue the tip and
successfully collected proceeds (or denied the claim entirely) that a whistleblower gains
rights and the balance of power begins to move away from the Service.186 One might
argue that a whistleblower is powerful because he or she may be the sole source of
information necessary for a tax prosecution; however, absent a whistleblower’s selfidentification as a whistleblower (via tip submission), the Service would usually be
unaware such information exists.
A whistleblower contract could also open a Pandora’s box of contractual obligations.
A contract would require the Service to provide the whistleblower consideration.187 The
Service’s consideration cannot be rights that the whistleblower already possesses.188 The
182

If the Service enters into a contract with a whistleblower, the contractual formalization of the
relationship itself implies a more equal power relationship. Even the bargaining itself grants a
whistleblower more power than he/she would have otherwise had.
183
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.3(1), Submission of Information for Award under Sections 7623(a) or (b), (as
amended Jun. 18, 2010) (“Individuals submitting information under section 7623(a) or (b) must complete
IRS Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information”.).
184
Other federal whistleblower programs provide compensation for tips; however, no other federal
whistleblower program is tasked with compensating tips for reporting tax violations.
185
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.5(1)(F), Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award, (as amended Jun. 18,
2010) (Claims will not be processed “that upon initial review have no merit or that lack sufficient specific
and credible information.”).
186
See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(b)(1), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013
at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“If the claimant believes that the Whistleblower Office erred in evaluating the
information provided, the claimant has 30 days from the date the Whistleblower Office sends the
preliminary award recommendation to submit comments to the Whistleblower Office. The Whistleblower
Office will review all comments submitted timely by the claimant (or the claimant's legal representative, if
any) and pay an award, pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section.”). See also Prop. Reg. § 301.76233(c)(3), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (the
whistleblower “will have 30 days…from the date of the preliminary award recommendation letter to
respond to the preliminary award recommendation…”).
187
See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.8 (2013) ("The definition of consideration given in Currie v.
Misa, is often used by American courts . . . : 'A valuable consideration ... may consist either in some right,
interest, profit, or benefit, accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." (citing Law. Rep. 10 Ex. 153 (1875)).
188
A contract requires bargained-for exchange. See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.1 (2013) ("The term
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Service may argue that it provides consideration by giving a whistleblower access to a
taxpayer’s return information. However, Regulation § 301.6103(n)-2 gives the Service
the discretion over whether it performs the disclosure,189 which may also be insufficient
consideration. 190 If the contract is, as the regulation states, “a written contract for
services,” then the Service’s consideration is most likely payment for those services.191
Such a contract would be at odds with the most basic requirements of the § 7623(b)
whistleblower program, namely compensation based on collected proceeds.192
The contract could also implicate agency duties to cooperate and compensate a
whistleblower,193 which the Service is not incentivized to undertake.194 The Service may
'consideration' has been used . . . to denote one reason deemed sufficient for enforcement of promises: the
bargained-for exchange. . . . [T]o have consideration there must be, at a minimum, a bargained-for
exchange."). If, in the contract, the Service only grants the whistleblower rights that he/she already has,
then the Service will not have provided adequate consideration. This is not adequate consideration because
the grant of rights would be a pre-existing duty, which is an impermissible category of consideration. See 27 Corbin on Contracts § 7.1 (2013) ("The very frequently stated rule is that neither the performance of duty
nor the promise to render a performance already required by duty is a consideration for a return promise.
This rule is known as the "pre-existing duty rule.").
189
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(1) (““[d]isclosure of return information in connection with a
written contract for services . . . shall be made only to the extent the IRS deems it necessary in connection
with the reasonable or proper performance of the contract.”).
190
If a party can choose whether to perform its promise, then the consideration is an illusory promise,
which is another category of impermissible consideration. See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (2013) ("If
the promisor bargains for some sort of real promise, and receives only an illusion, there is no contract for
the reason that the offer has not been accepted as well as for the reason that there is no consideration for the
offeror's promise."). See also 1-1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.17 (2013) ("As this term itself implies, an
illusory promise is not a promise at all as that term has been herein defined. If the expression appears to
have the form of a promise, this appearance is an illusion. Suppose, for example, that X guarantees
payment of P's note in return for C's written promise to forbear from suing P as long as C wishes to forbear.
In this case C's words may create the illusion of a promise, but, in fact, C has made no promise. The
fundamental element of promise is a promisor's expression of intention that the promisor's future conduct
shall be in accord with the present expression, irrespective of what the promisor's will may be when the
time for performance arrives. In the supposed case, the words used by C are not such as may reasonably be
relied upon by P. The clear meaning of the expression is that C's future conduct will be in accord with his
or her own future will, just as it would have been had nothing at all been said.").
191
26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2.
192
See I.R.C. § 7623(b). Even if the contract specified that payment could not be made until proceeds
were collected (as per the statute and regulations), the Service has such control over the processes of
whether the tip is pursued, how the examination is conducted, whether to compromise a tax deficiency, and
how/when collection is obtained, that compensation under such a contract could be considered an illusory
promise.
193
Even assuming that the Service provided legally sufficient consideration and entered into a
“contract for services” with a whistleblower, such a contract implicates agency questions. An agreement
where one party acts on behalf of another is an agency. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 1.01
(2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). If an agency is created by a §
6103(n) contract, then the Service becomes the principal, and a principal has duties to its agent. See
Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13 (2006) (“A principal has a duty to act in accordance with the
express and implied terms of any contract between the principal and the agent. In particular, a principal has
a duty of compensation to its agent. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13, comment d (2006)
(“Unless an agreement between a principal and an agent indicates otherwise, a principal has a duty to pay
compensation to an agent for services that the agent provides.”). A principal also has a duty to cooperate
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also be reluctant to create an agency relationship with a whistleblower because it wants to
avoid deputizing a whistleblower. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing could also
obligate the Service in a whistleblower contract.195 Finally, the language used within §
301.6103-(n)(2)(b)(3) could obligate the Service to respond to whistleblower inquiries
about the status of the claim.196
While the code and regulation permit contractual arrangement between the
whistleblower and the Service in section § 6103(n), a whistleblower contract exposes the
Service to potential hazards. It follows that the Service may perceive a contract as too
risky and too costly when compared its potential benefits.
2. The Administrative/Judicial Proceeding Exception
Another exception for disclosing taxpayer information to whistleblowers is found in §
6103(h)(4) and relates to administrative and judicial proceedings.197 Subparagraph (h)(4)
allows the Service to disclose return information in an administrative or judicial
proceeding if “the proceeding arose out of, or in connection with, determining the

with its agent. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13, comment b (2006) (“A principal's implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing obliges the principal to refrain from unreasonable
interference with the agent's completion of work. The principal is subject to this duty when the principal
has agreed to furnish an agent with an opportunity for work, in addition to agreeing to compensate the
agent.”).
194
The Service is currently attracting tips and cooperation of whistleblowers without obligating itself
to provide any mandatory compensation or cooperation. Any duty of the Service to compensate and/or
cooperate with a whistleblower is restrained by various limits in the statute, regulations and IRM.
Presumably, the Service created the regulatory and IRM restrictions to allow for discretion in the use of
whistleblowers.
195
Additional contractual concerns arise when the Service and a whistleblower enter into a § 6103(n)
agreement. When the Service enters into a contract with a private citizen, the contractual requirement of
good faith and fair dealing still governs the transaction. See Fredrick W. Claybrook Jr., Good Faith in the
Termination and Formation of Federal Contracts, 56 MD. L. REV. 555 (1997) (citing United States v.
Bostwick, 94 U.S. 5, 66 (1876), United States v. Winstar Corp., 116, S. Ct. 2432, 2464-65 (1996) (plurality
opinion)). Good faith requires prevents a party from denying the benefit of the contract to the other party.
See 6-26 Corbin on Contracts § 26.1 (2013) (“[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there is an implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing.” (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163,
167 (1933))). Is the Service fulfilling good faith when its actions prevent collected proceeds from being
fully realized? A whistleblower may be misled into thinking his or her cooperation is guaranteeing
eventual award payment. The existing statutory, regulatory and administrative process prevent the Service
from making award guarantees.
196
Under § 301.6103-(n)(2)(b)(3), a whistleblower may inquire about the status of the submitted claim.
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(3). The Service’s obligation to answer the inquiry is not clear. The
regulation does not use mandatory language to describe the Service’s response. Rather, the regulation uses
permissive language that the Service “may inform” the whistleblower of the claim’s status. On its face, the
regulation does not obligate the Service to answer the whistleblower’s inquiry. The regulation further
limits disclosure when it impedes or impairs the investigation. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(3).
Nonetheless, this murky inquiry privilege may be yet another source of the Service’s caution in entering
into a tax administration contract under § 6103(n).
197
See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4).
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taxpayer’s civil or criminal liability.” 198 This exception contemplates the use of a
taxpayer’s return information in a proceeding where the information is at issue or is
related to the proceeding. This exception could apply to a whistleblower award claim if
(1) the whistleblower tip is sufficiently connected with determining the taxpayer’s tax
liability, and (2) the whistleblower’s claim is a proceeding.
For the first factor, sufficient nexus to satisfy (h)(4) may be found within the
language within § 7623, its regulations, and the Internal Revenue Manual. The Service
has taken the position that, under § 7623, whistleblower awards may only be paid from
proceeds collected from a taxpayer “by reason of information provided.”199 Collected
proceeds are produced only from the assessment and collection of tax liability, interest or
penalties from a taxpayer.200 Assessment and collection of proceeds could be considered
to be “in connection with, determining the taxpayer’s civil . . . liability, or the collection
of such civil liability.”
As for the second factor, the Service has repeatedly taken the position that a
whistleblower claim can result in an administrative proceeding.201 However, the Service’s
most recent identification of the commencement of a whistleblower administrative
proceeding eliminates the Service’s ability to use this § 6013 exception for whistleblower
debriefing. Previously, the Service identified the filing of the initial whistleblower claim
as the beginning of a whistleblower administrative proceeding. 202 If the filing a
whistleblower claim or tip marks the beginning of an administrative proceeding, then
subsequent actions in the proceeding, including the claim investigation, appears to fall
within the exception. More recently proposed regulations identify much later events as
the trigger for an administrative proceeding.203 For § 7623(b) claims,204 the Proposed
198

See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4) (emphasis added).
26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1(a)(2).
200
See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
201
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.8 Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as amended Jun. 18, 2010).
(“The whistleblower award review and determination process is an administrative proceeding that begins
on the date the claim for award is received by the Whistleblower Office.”); Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(b)(1),
77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“The whistleblower
administrative proceeding described in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section begins on the date the
Whistleblower Office sends the preliminary award recommendation letter.”); Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(c),
77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“The whistleblower
administrative proceeding described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) of this section begins on the date the
Whistleblower Office sends the preliminary award recommendation letter.”).
202
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.8 Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as amended Jun. 18, 2010)
(“The whistleblower award review and determination process is an administrative proceeding that begins
on the date the claim for award is received by the Whistleblower Office.”).
203
The proposed regulations make a distinction between the claims filed under § 7623(a) and §
7623(b). See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3, 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at
78 Fed. Reg. 8062).
204
For 7623(a) claims, for which the Service maintains discretion over award payment, the Proposed
Regulations identify the start of the administrative proceeding as when the Service issues a preliminary
award recommendation. Because the Service has discretion to pay a § 7623(a) award, the proposed
regulations provide that an award denial under § 7623(a) is not an administrative proceeding. Only the
recommendation of an award amount rises to the level, under the Proposed Regulations. See Prop. Reg. §
301.7623-3(b)(1), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062).
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Regulations state that an administrative proceeding commences when the Service issues a
preliminary award recommendation or an award denial letter.205
The Service has not explained its reasons for proposing a later date, but a
consequence of a later date is lower administrative costs through reduced exposure to Tax
Court litigation from whistleblowers. If the beginning of an administrative proceeding
occurred at the filing of a whistleblower’s claim, the Service would grant whistleblowers
earlier availability to challenge an award determination in Tax Court.206 By postponing
the administrative proceeding start, the Service may have limited its Tax Court burden.
A side effect of that decision is that the Service limited its ability to use the
administrative proceeding exception to taxpayer privacy.207 If the Service had interpreted
the start of a whistleblower administrative proceeding differently, this exception could
have permitted disclosure of taxpayer’s return information during whistleblower
debriefing.
3. The Investigative Purpose Exception
Both the tax administration contract and administrative proceeding exceptions to
taxpayer privacy had the potential to permit whistleblower debriefing; however, the
Service’s current choices with respect to contracts and whistleblower claims have limited
the utility of the aforementioned exceptions. Consequently, the investigative purpose
exception offers the sole exception to taxpayer privacy that permits whistleblower
debriefing. Fortunately, this exception provides the Service with nearly boundless
authority to disclose taxpayer information to whistleblowers.
Section 6103(k)(6) allows disclosure of tax return information if the disclosure is
“necessary” to obtain information not otherwise available for “audit, collection activity,
or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other offense under the internal revenue

205

See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(c), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at
78 Fed. Reg. 8062).
206
Section 7623(b)(4) gives whistleblowers the right to appeal to Tax Court “any determination
regarding an award.” I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4). A determination can be an award, denial of an award, and even a
refusal to issue an award or denial. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (“any determination regarding an award”);
Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70 (2010) (“The statute expressly permits an individual to seek judicial
review in this Court of the amount or denial of an award determination.”); Order in Insigna v.
Commissioner (T.C. Mar. 13, 2013) (No. 4609-12W) (“[W]e have jurisdiction if there has been ‘[a]ny
determination regarding an award.’ If the IRS has in fact finished its consideration of an award claim and
has not made an award, then evidently it has "determined" to conclude the matter administratively without
granting an award. In order for us to decide whether (as petitioner contends) the IRS has made such a
defacto determination, we may need to learn: whether the IRS has completed its consideration of
petitioner's claim; what, if anything, the IRS is still doing with regard to petitioner's claim; and whether the
IRS expects to do anything in the future with regard to petitioner's claim. If there has been a cessation of
administrative action, then a reviewable determination may have been effectively made thereby.”). Once
the Service establishes that an administrative proceeding has begun in the whistleblower process, it follows
that a “determination” must result from the administrative proceeding.
207
Given the large number of pending whistleblower claims perhaps the Service is attempting to avoid
the potential administrative burden of litigating a large number of whistleblower award determinations. See
WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2012 REPORT, supra note __ and accompanying text.
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laws.”208 The corresponding regulation adds the requirement that the Service employee
must “reasonably believe, under the facts and circumstances, at the time of a disclosure,
the information is not otherwise reasonably available, or if the activity connected with the
official duties cannot occur properly without the disclosure.” 209 The investigative
purpose exception provides the Service with expansive authority to disclose return
information. This exception does not limit who may be a recipient of the disclosure so
long as the disclosure itself is “necessary.” Similarly, the purposes for which disclosure
may be made are also limited only by a list covering most Service functions.210 The
requirements of “necessary” for the investigation and not otherwise “reasonably available”
are very low bars for disclosing taxpayer information to a whistleblower during
debriefing. The Service’s current whistleblower debriefing policy, as articulated in the
2012 Deputy Commissioner’s Memo, presumably relies on the § 6103(k)(6) investigative
purpose exception when it encouraged whistleblower debriefing.211
4. Consequences and Taxpayer Privacy
Similar to the Fourth Amendment analysis previously discussed, violations of
taxpayer privacy are unlikely to result in a thwarted examination.212 The Service appears
to be reluctant to disclose taxpayer information to whistleblowers despite the availability
of a broad investigative purpose exception. This is highly ironic, considering that in 2012
the Service reported that 8.3 billion disclosures were made pursuant to § 6103
exceptions.213 The Service’s reluctance to disclose to whistleblowers is likely related to
the inability to control any subsequent disclosure by a whistleblower and fear of personal
ramifications.
The Service may be reluctant to use the investigative purpose exception because,
once it discloses taxpayer return information to a whistleblower under this exception, the
Service has limited control over any subsequent disclosures by the whistleblower. Unlike
208

See I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (“An internal revenue officer or employee and an officer or employee of the
Office of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration may, in connection with his official duties
relating to any audit, collection activity, or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other offense under the
internal revenue laws, disclose return information to the extent that such disclosure is necessary in
obtaining information, which is not otherwise reasonably available, with respect to the correct
determination of tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be collected or with respect to the enforcement of
any other provision of this title. Such disclosures shall be made only in such situations and under such
conditions as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.”).
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26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(a)(2).
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26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(a).
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See Miller Memo, supra note __.
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See United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 596 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2002) (noting that Congress has
created statutory criminal and civil penalties for violations of taxpayer privacy but neither provision
requires the exclusion of the underlying evidence obtained); Nowicki v. Comm’r, 262 F.3d 1162, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2001) (finding the imposition of the exclusionary rule is not required for disclosure of return
information that violates taxpayer privacy rights.); United States v. Stein, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74030, 7-8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008) (stating that courts have created additional remedies for taxpayer privacy
violations because Congress has already provided civil and criminal remedies).
213
See Joint Committee on Taxation, Disclosure Report for Public Inspection Pursuant to Internal
Revenue Code Section 6103(p)(3)(C) for Calendar Year 2012 (JCX-8-13), Apr. 15, 2013,
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4514.
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the administrative contract exception, there is no requirement for the recipient of the
information to keep it confidential. As Whistleblower Office Director Stephen Whitlock
has stated publicly, “publicity is a two-edged sword.”214 Publicity may help or harm any
particular Service investigation; however, disclosure of return information generally runs
contrary to the Service’s culture.215
The consequences for violating taxpayer privacy may be more painful to the
Service’s personnel than the sting of a lost evidentiary battle under the exclusionary
rule.216 Violation of taxpayer privacy rights may lead to criminal or civil penalties as well
as dismissal from employment.217 Aggrieved taxpayers may also file suit against the
Service for civil damages when their returns or return information is improperly
disclosed.218 Perhaps creating an even greater incentive within the Service to protect
taxpayer privacy, § 7213(a)(1) authorizes criminal penalties for a Service employee’s
willful disclosure of return information.219 All of these consequences, as frightful as they
are, are for improper disclosures. The investigative purpose exception requires only that
a disclosure be “necessary” for the investigation and not otherwise “reasonably available”
to be lawful. A whistleblower debriefing that is undertaken for lawful purposes as part of
an examination is necessary for the purposes of verifying allegations or investigating the
extent of wrongdoing.
Even if rarely invoked, the very existence of the criminal statute coupled with the
zero tolerance policy likely creates a culture of hyper privacy protection within the
Service. While the Services faces a challenge in changing its culture and employees’
mindsets in creating a more engaging whistleblower debriefing policy, taxpayer privacy
exceptions cannot be viewed as a barrier to whistleblower debriefing.
IV. NEW APPROACHES TO DEBRIEFING
The three previous Parts have explained how a Service culture resistant to
whistleblowers, an overly burdensome administrative process, and mild legal obstacles
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have resulted in Service policies that fail to collect available information from
whistleblowers. These obstacles are not insurmountable, nor should they be permitted to
relegate the tax whistleblower program to delays and inefficiencies. The Service should
reconsider what it means to debrief a whistleblower, how debriefing occurs, and how
debriefing might bring efficiencies to the program. The following Part suggests specific
improvements to the Service’s debriefing policies for more efficient tax enforcement.
A. The Service’s Definition of Debriefing
Service’s policy pronouncements, in combination with other evidence, reveal that
whistleblower debriefing occurs pre-examination, if at all, and involves a narrow set of
topics. Indeed, Director Whitlock has publicly articulated the Service’s limited time
period for debriefing. In 2012, he was quoted as stating that “[t]he IRS does not involve
whistleblowers in case analysis or audits. A whistleblower may be debriefed while the
claim is being evaluated, before the audit has begun. . . . After the audit has begun, it's
hands off.”220 This is particularly troublesome because, as the Service moves along in an
examination, it is in a better position to ask relevant questions of a whistleblower. For
sophisticated, multi-step, multi–entity, or international transactions, this is likely the
situation.
Given the preliminary stage at which the Service undertakes debriefing,
unsurprisingly, the subjects covered appear to lack significant substance. What is
surprising, however, is just how preliminary they are. For the Service,221 debriefing is an
administrative procedure ensuring legality of the whistleblower’s information and
apprising the whistleblower of the Service’s policies.222 The Checksheet seeks only
preliminary information; it primarily serves to ensure that a whistleblower is giving
truthful, voluntary information and to advise the whistleblower that the Service will
endeavor to protect the whistleblower’s identity throughout the lengthy process. 223
Nothing on the Checksheet asks for substantive information. The Checksheet even fails
to request basic information about the whistleblower, his or her relationship with the
taxpayer, or other facts about the underlying tip. While it is possible that other, nonpublic policies exist detailing substantive matters on which to question whistleblowers,
making such policy public would equip whistleblower attorneys with the information
necessary to allow them to serve as gatekeepers to proactively identify and funnel
relevant information to the Service.
B. A Better Definition of Debriefing
The debriefing process should be utilized as another tool in the Service’s arsenal to
provide key information during the entire investigation process. Debriefing can be
tremendously useful to the Service as it seeks to remedy systemic information
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asymmetry. The utility of debriefing may appear only after the Service staff has
performed its due diligence of the transactions. Prior to the investment of time, Service
staff may not grasp the relevant questions. The Service’s reluctance to utilize the
whistleblower after initiation of an examination is an inefficient use of time and financial
resources.
The Service should view whistleblower information as a potential remedy against the
inherent structural information asymmetry, and debriefing as a tool that promotes
communication with the whistleblower. To improve the debriefing process, the initial
debriefing should expand far beyond the Checksheet to allow for detailed observational
and substantive information that is not available from the written submission. Debriefing
should seek to collect information for procedural, substantive and programmatic
purposes.
Debriefing should collect information about the taxpayer, the whistleblower, and their
relationship. Successful debriefing should shed light on the motivation and veracity of
the whistleblower, which may be useful as the Service’s investigates the claim. In
addition, expanding the initial debriefing would also allow the Service to foresee
potential Fourth Amendment limitations for subsequent searches.
Fourth Amendment governmental instrument law, while not crystal clear or totally
uniform, is not an impassable morass. Several principles can be gleaned from the Fourth
Amendment discussion in Part III. First, to avoid deputizing IRS whistleblowers, the
key inquiry will be whether the government knew of or acquiesced in a subsequent
private search. In the first contact that an employee whistleblower has with the Service,
any documents that an employee whistleblower passes to the Service will be safely
outside the scope of the first factor. In other words, the private search would have
occurred before the Service even knew about it. There is no genuine Fourth Amendment
concern with a prior search of which the Service has no contemporaneous knowledge.
The issue then is, subsequent to a first meeting, can the Service avoid knowing about
or acquiescing in any further searches? The Service has previously avoided this issue by
refusing subsequent whistleblower interviews. This is not necessary. Here, a simple
solution may be a scripted disclaimer by the Service that the whistleblower acknowledges
in writing. The disclaimer would not be a “wink and a nod” as courts have discouraged.
It would rather be a clear and thorough statement of law and policy that allows the
Service to disclaim knowledge or acquiescence in any subsequent whistleblower
search.224
The Debriefing Checksheet’s current admonishment that a whistleblower should not
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misinterpret a debriefing question as a request for the whistleblower to acquire more
information is a nod towards avoiding tainted subsequent searches but it does not explain
the issue and it does not firmly state that whistleblowers should not undertake any
subsequent searches. The current Checksheet statement is too subtle. Both the
Checksheet and Service staff should be more definitive during first interviews so that the
Service is protected against the possibility of tainted evidence but is not foreclosed from
further information collection.
Debriefing should also seek to collect substantive information. It should expand upon
the information included in a whistleblower’s written submission. While debriefing can
occur pre-examination and assist in preparing for and guiding an exam, it should not be
confined exclusively to pre-examination. As explained above, neither taxpayer privacy
nor search law requires such a limitation. The Service can allow a whistleblower to serve
as a monitor who prompts enforcement as well as a quasi-expert who provides guidance
on sophisticated transactions during an examination.
In addition, the Service should view debriefing as a device for opening
communication with the whistleblower. A debriefing meeting offers the Service the
opportunity to validate a whistleblower, his/her contribution, and instill in the
whistleblower the impression that the Service will attempt to act upon the
whistleblower’s information. Whistleblowers who participate in debriefing throughout
the investigation should feel more engaged in the process and this feeling of contributing
to an important process may help offset the discontent of a long wait for an award. Social
science research suggests that fulfilling these whistleblower needs may have a positive
effect on the future stream of tips.
Finally, the Service should use the debriefing process to collect information on
whistleblower demographics, attributes, antecedents, tips attributes, and timing. This
information would allow the Service to analyze its current stream of tip and measure the
program’s efficacy. In addition to collecting information on examinations in which a
whistleblower is debriefed, the Service should collect information on whistlebloweridentified examination in which a whistleblower is debriefed. The Service needs to learn
when to and how to debrief a whistleblower to ensure that debriefing is used efficiently.
Collecting and analyzing this information is the key to future policy and program
refinement. Without this kind of data, the Service’s future policy refinements will be
little more than blind guesses.
C. How Does Better Debriefing Fit into Whistleblower Policy?
The Service should use subsequent debriefings with an employee whistleblower to
gain insight and explanation of an employer’s tax transactions and develop an
understanding the complexities of underlying tax transactions and taxpayer workpapers.
Expanding debriefing in this fashion will improve the efficiency of the Whistleblower
Program, but debriefing can also improve efficiency in other areas, especially in the
determination of which tips to pursue. Efficient sorting and screening of tips is an
imperative component of a successful whistleblower program. Given that whistleblower
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motivations can be vengeful, ethical, monetary or some combination thereof, it follows
that potential whistleblower tips are of a variety of kinds and quality. When the tips
arrive, the Service must efficiently sort out the least meritorious, least revenuegenerating, and resource-intensive tips. Currently, the Service solely uses internal
screening mechanisms, which are labor-intensive and a direct cost. The Service could
improve the process if debriefing moved beyond the Checksheet and served as a
screening mechanism to quickly sort tips that are inefficient to pursue and prioritize the
remaining tips. Debriefing should not only be a forum in which to collect information
but should also be used as a tool to promote efficiency. The Service should reap process
efficiencies in addition to informational benefits.
The addition of the whistleblower should promote a more productive examination.
The Service can measure an examination’s productivity by revenue generated,
examination time, or a combination thereof. To ensure that whistleblower involvement
does not burden the process, the Service must measure revenue, timing, and efficiency.
More importantly, once baselines are established, the Service must set standards and add
accountability to enforce the standards. The 2012 Miller Memo set timeframes for
reviewing whistleblower claims.225 Specifically, the Memo set 90-day processing times
during specific steps in the review of a whistleblower claim. The Memo suggests that the
Service should take not more than 90 days for each of the following steps: (1) conduct an
initial evaluation,226 (2) subject matter expert evaluation of the claim,227and (3) notify a
whistleblower regarding final award determination.228 Currently, the 90-day timeframes
are not being met. The current averages are 131 days, 299 days, and 285 days,
respectively.229 Because the Service never established baselines and has not published
recent revenue, timing or efficiency comparators, it is difficult to determine whether 90day benchmarks are appropriate for these activities. Moreover, the 2012 Memo’s
timeframes present aspirational goals, but there is no accountability to ensure these
timeframes are met.
The Service should envision debriefing as a tool with which to streamline the
administrative burden. For example, over-involvement of counsel during an examination
can lead to delays. To limit counsel involvement, the Service should rewrite its
whistleblower policies so that staff may more easily apply them without resorting to the
time-consuming involvement of counsel. Staff should be provided with clear guidance
on the Fourth Amendment limitations and explanations of law and policies. This would
avoid applying case-by-case analysis to all whistleblowers cases. Guidance should also
be given in a tone that promotes rather than dissuades whistleblower usage.
The tone of whistleblower policy can also be used beyond debriefing. The Service
has, at its disposal, a potentially powerful enforcement mechanism in the form of
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whistleblowers. Reaping the potential efficiencies and assistance will require prioritizing
promising cases involving whistleblowers and incentivizing staff to undertake these
cases. If the Service’s staff perceive that whistleblower involvement slows or burdens
cases, then the Service should endeavor to eliminate the burdens and tip the scales in
favor of these cases. Policy revisions that unburden whistleblower cases will likely have a
greater effect on cultural resistance within the Service than any aspiration policy could
ever hope to have.
CONCLUSION
While the Service’s current whistleblower debriefing policy is a welcome change
from prior policies, it does not gather all available whistleblower information and
ultimately fails to utilize whistleblowers throughout examinations. Debriefing serves
mainly as a review of a whistleblower’s legal rights and preliminary interview. Despite
calls for widespread whistleblower debriefing, the Service’s policies limit whistleblower
debriefing and forbid whistleblower involvement during an ongoing examination.
While there are limitations to using employee whistleblowers resulting from Fourth
Amendment restrictions and taxpayer privacy law, a review of applicable law shows
significant latitude for government-whistleblower interactions during an investigation.
The restrictions are navigable with policy changes and well-trained Service personnel.
The Service should not resign itself to either under-utilizing or over-utilizing employee
whistleblowers. To date, the Service has been overly cautious in its policies for
maximizing the full potential of employee whistleblowers. By expanding the Service’s
conception of what it means to debrief, the Service can use whistleblower interviews to
collect procedural, substantive and programmatic information. The Service should also
expand the time period during which it debriefs whistleblowers to include examinations.
This would enable whistleblowers to serve dual functions of monitors who prompt
enforcement and quasi-experts who provide guidance.
Above all, the Service should reimagine debriefing as more than a tool for
information collection. It can also be a tool for program and process improvement.
Debriefing can be used to screen, sort, and prioritize whistleblower tips. Efficiencies can
only be gained, however, if the Service gathers information on whistleblowers and their
tips as well as measures the revenue, timings and efficiency of the processes. The
Service must ensure that measurement is accompanied by appropriate and attainable
standards that are enforced with accountability.
***

